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Summary 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created as a compliment to 
domestic courts in the global fight against impunity. However, customary 
international law has afforded Heads of State with immunity from 
prosecution, even for serious international crimes. Some key challenges of 
international criminal law are to reconcile the competing objectives of 
maintaining stable international relations, and protecting the sovereignty of 
States, through immunity rules and ensuring that perpetrators of international 
crimes are held accountable.  
 
These challenges are currently under intense scrutiny. Some State Parties to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) are 
refusing to comply with the ICC’s request to arrest Omar Hassan Al Bashir, 
the incumbent President of Sudan. Bashir is facing charges before the ICC 
due to a referral by the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) to the ICC of 
the situation in Darfur, Sudan. Sudan is not a party to the Statute. Therefore, 
State Parties argues customary international law governs the relationship 
between them and Sudan. According to the states, this entails that Bashir is 
entitled to immunity from being arrested, even when the arrest is sought by 
ICC.  
 
The purpose of this thesis was to discuss and analyse the concept of Head of 
State immunity and the obligation states have to respect such immunity. 
Immunity rules under customary international law has been analysed in 
relation to State Party obligations pursuant to the Rome Statute to disregard 
such immunity when the Court seeks to arrest an incumbent Head of State. 
The purpose included clarifying which legal regime applies with regards to 
the allegedly conflicting obligations for State Parties when a situation is 
before the ICC pursuant to a referral of a situation by the UNSC.  
 
As there is no genuine solution of norm conflict in international law, the 
author has opted for a legal dogmatic method combined with international 
legal doctrine. As such, interpretation of the relevant sources of law 
according to established principles has been of focus. In order to provide the 
most appropriate interpretation of the relevant legal regimes, the thesis 
includes a historical and political perspective. There is also sufficient 
evidence African states are not willing to cooperate with the ICC due to 
political concerns.  
 
The development of customary international law governing Head of State 
immunity entails that personal immunity before domestic courts is absolute. 
However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) opened up for an exception 
which removes personal Head of State immunity before international courts. 
Incumbent Heads of State has since then been arrested and prosecuted before 
e.g. the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court of Sierra Leone.  
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Scholars have argued that the ICJ suggested there is a new rule under 
customary international law which removes Head of State immunity before 
international jurisdiction. The author of this thesis argues that state practice 
has not yet constituted such exception. Instead, the author argues 
international courts have applied different legal regimes enabling them to 
prosecute and arrest incumbent Heads of States. These regimes provide for 
provisions which make that legal regime prevailing over customary 
international law. 
 
In efforts to solve the issues of non-cooperation in the Bashir case, the ICC’s 
three-panel Pre-trial Chamber (PTC) has issued decisions against several 
State Parties. In line with these decisions, the author argues that the legal 
effect of a UNSC resolution referring a situation to the ICC is that the Rome 
Statute in its entirety is applicable to that situation. By applying a teleological 
interpretation of the referral mechanism and Resolution 1593, Sudan should 
be treated analogously to a State Party under the Rome Statute. Under the 
Rome Statute, State Parties cannot impose personal immunity as a bar for 
prosecution. As such, the Rome Statute prevails over customary international 
law on immunities. It has been argued that removal of immunity before the 
ICC only applies to its jurisdiction. The author argues it applies also at the 
national level, when national authorities act in support of the ICC.  
 
However, the PTC has been inconsistent in its decisions, applying different 
legal rationales. Therefore, the legal rationale, to some extent, lacks 
credibility. This fact opens up for critique and leaves the legal rationale 
ineffective. The author of this thesis argues against this critique. However, 
higher authority must address these matters to provide acceptance to the legal 
rationale in the international community. The ICC’s Appeals Chamber has 
this opportunity since Jordan appealed the decision on non-cooperation 
against it.  
 
The credibility of the legal rationale is to some extent also dependent on 
political actions. The Assembly of State Parties to the ICC has called upon 
State Parties to comply with ICC’s arrest warrant. UNSC is the sole actor 
involved, which has not taken any measures to either endorse or decline the 
legal rationale issued by the PTC. 
 
Leaving the legal issues to the politically oriented UNSC is neither desirable 
nor compatible with respect for the rule of law. Therefore, Jordan’s appeal 
and the future judgment by the Appeals Chamber are crucial for the future 
practice by the ICC. Specifically, with regards to personal Head of State 
immunity in situations referred by the UNSC.  
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Sammanfattning 
Den internationella brottsmålsdomstolen skapades som ett komplement till 
nationella domstolar i den globala kampen mot straffrihet. Internationell 
sedvanerätt har dock medgett immunitet mot åtal för höga statschefer, även 
för allvarliga internationella brott. Att upprätthålla stabila internationella 
relationer och skydda staters suveränitet genom immunitetsregler konkurrerar 
gentemot att se till att gärningsmän av internationella brott hålls ansvariga. 
Detta är en stor utmaning inom det internationella samfundet. 
 
Denna utmaning är för närvarande under intensiv debatt. Vissa av 
Romstadgans parter vägrar att samarbeta med domstolens framställning om 
samarbete för att gripa Omar Hassan Al Bashir, Sudans president. Sudan är 
inte part till Romstadgan för den internationella brottsmålsdomstolen 
(Romstadgan), men åtalet mot Bashir är möjligt efter att FN:s säkerhetsråd 
hänförde situationen i Darfur till domstolen. Parterna till Romstadgan hävdar 
att internationell sedvanerätt reglerar förhållandet mellan dem och Sudan, 
vilket enligt dem ger Bashir rätt till immunitet mot att gripas, även om 
arresteringsordern kommer från den internationella brottsmålsdomstolen.  
 
Syftet med denna uppsats är att diskutera och analysera immunitet för höga 
statschefer och de skyldigheter som stater har att respektera sådan immunitet. 
Reglering av immunitet under internationell sedvanerätt analyseras i relation 
till de skyldigheter som stadgas i Romstadgan. Dessa skyldigheter inkluderar 
att parter ska bortse från immunitetsskyddet under sedvanerätten när 
domstolen beslutar om en arresteringsorder mot en statschef. Syftet är således 
att förtydliga vilken rättsordning som gäller rörande immunitet när FN:s 
säkerhetsråd hänfört en situation till den internationella brottsmålsdomstolen 
jurisdiktion.  
 
Eftersom det inte finns någon genuin lösning av normkonflikter inom 
folkrätten har författaren besvarat frågeställningarna och uppfyllt syftet med 
en rättsdogmatisk metod i kombination med den folkrättsliga doktrinen. 
Således har fokus legat vid tolkning av rättskällorna enligt etablerade 
tolkningsprinciper. För att möjliggöra den mest korrekta tolkningen av 
rättskällorna är uppsatsen därför skriven med ett historiskt och politiskt 
perspektiv. Det finns också anledning att tro att vissa av stadgeparterna 
vägrar att samarbeta med domstolen på grund av politiska skäl. 
 
Immunitet för statschefer under internationell sedvanerätt är absolut inför 
nationella domstolar. Den internationella domstolen (ICJ) har emellertid 
öppnat upp för ett undantag för personlig immunitet inför internationella 
domstolar. Sedan dess har flera sittande statschefer gripits och åtalats vid 
exempelvis den internationella krigsförbrytartribunalen för det forna 
Jugoslavien, Internationella krigsförbrytartribunalen för Rwanda och 
särskilda domstolen för Sierra Leone.  
 
Akademiker har argumenterat att ICJ föreslog att det har utvecklats en ny 
regel under den internationella sedvanerätten som tar bort statschefers 
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immunitet under internationell jurisdiktion. Författaren av denna uppsats 
hävdar att statspraxis ännu inte bekräftat en sådan ny regel. I stället 
argumenterar författaren att internationella domstolar har tillämpat andra 
rättskällor som gör det möjligt för dem att åtala och gripa sittande statschefer. 
Dessa rättskällor föreskriver bestämmelser som innebär att den rättskällan 
tillämpas i stället för internationell sedvanerätt.  
 
Under ansträngningar att försöka lösa problemen har den internationella 
brottsmålsdomstolen prövat flera fall där stadgeparter har vägrat tillmötesgå 
framställningen om samarbete i gripandet av Bashir. I samtliga beslut har 
domstolen fastställt att staternas agerande står i strid med Romstadgan. I linje 
med dessa beslut argumenterar författaren att den rättsliga effekten av en 
säkerhetsrådsresolution som hänför en situation till den internationella 
brottsmålsdomstolen är att Romstadgan i dess helhet är tillämplig i den 
situationen. Genom att tillämpa teologisk tolkning av mekanismen för FN att 
hänföra situationer till domstolen och av resolution 1593, bör Sudan 
behandlas analogt med en stadgepart under Romstadgan. Enligt stadgan kan 
parterna inte yrka personlig immunitet som skydd mot åtal. Romstadgan 
gäller före internationell sedvanerätt. Det har också argumenterats för att 
detta endast gäller för utövande av domstolens jurisdiktion. Författaren 
argumenterar för att immunitetsreglerna inte heller gäller på nationell nivå 
när nationella myndigheter agerar stöd för den internationella 
brottsmålsdomstolen med att arrestera en person.  
 
Domstolen har emellertid varit inkonsekvent i sina beslut. Domskälen har 
varierat vilket resulterat i kritik och fortsatt vägran av stadgeparter att 
tillmötesgå domstolens framställning om gripande. Författaren argumenterar 
emot denna kritik. För att öka trovärdigheten för besluten i det internationella 
samfundet måste domstolens överklagandekammare pröva de juridiska 
frågorna. Kammaren har numera denna möjlighet efter att Jordanien 
överklagat det beslut som föreskrev att Jordanien agerat i strid med 
Romstadgan när staten inte grep Bashir under ett statsbesök på dess 
territorium. 
 
Till viss del är acceptansen också beroende av politiska överväganden. 
Partsförsamlingen för internationella brottsmålsdomstolen har uppmanat 
stadgeparterna att verkställa domstolens arresteringsorder. FN:s säkerhetsråd 
är den enda inblandade aktören som inte vidtagit några åtgärder för att 
påverka situationen.  
 
Att helt överlämna de rättsliga frågorna till det politiskt inriktade 
säkerhetsrådet är inte önskvärt och inte heller förenligt med rättsliga 
principer. Därför är Jordaniens överklagande och överklagandekammarens 
framtida dom avgörande för domstolens framtida arbete, speciellt vad gäller 
personlig immunitet för höga statschefer i situationer som hänskjuts till 
domstolen av FN:s säkerhetsråd.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
On 17 July 1998, 120 states made history by voting to adopt the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute/the Statute)1, 
creating the world’s first permanent international court. Four years later, the 
Statute obtained the requisite sixty ratifications for its entry into force and 
one year later the International Criminal Court (ICC/the Court) was fully 
operational. The Rome Statute provided for the creation of an international 
criminal court with authority to try cases and punish individuals for the most 
serious human rights violations. As a court of last resort, ICC seeks to 
complement national courts in the global fight against impunity, with the 
intention that no one, not even a Head of State, should go unpunished after 
committing grave international crimes.2 
 
However, customary international law has afforded Heads of State with 
immunity from prosecution, even for serious international crimes, enabling 
them to evade justice. With the rise of the human rights movement and 
greater international support for ending impunity for perpetrators of 
international crimes, including the establishment of the ICC, immunity 
boundaries are being questioned.3 
 
Some key challenges of international criminal law are to reconcile the 
competing objectives of maintaining stable international relations, and 
protecting the sovereignty of States, through immunity rules and ensuring 
that perpetrators of international crimes are held accountable. These 
challenges are currently under intense scrutiny as a result of the Rome 
Statute’s State Parties refusal to comply with ICC’s request for the arrest of 
Omar Hassan Al Bashir (Bashir), the incumbent President of Sudan. 
Specifically, the aforementioned case includes the question if Bashir as the 
serving Head of State of a non-party to the Rome Statute, subjected to 
prosecution before ICC due to the referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan, 
by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), enjoys immunity from 
being arrested and surrendered to the ICC by State Parties to the Rome 
Statute.4 As the first situation referred to the ICC by the UNSC, questions are 
raised with regards to which international legal regime applies in such a 
situation.  
 
 
                                                
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, 
2 William Schabas, An introduction to the International Criminal Court, (Fifth edition., 
Cambridge, 2017) viii. 
3Xiaodong Yang, State immunity in international law, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2012) xvi. 
4 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593, 31 March 2005. 
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Bashir is currently facing charges of crimes against humanity, genocide, and 
war crimes against the civil population in Darfur.5 The Rome Statute 
prohibits trials in abstentia.6 Therefore, in order to continue proceedings, the 
ICC must obtain physical custody of Bashir. As the ICC has no enforcement 
powers, it must rely on either State Parties to cooperate with its request or on 
the voluntary surrender of Bashir by Sudan or Bashir himself. 
 
In recent years, several State Parties to the Rome Statute have faced the 
conflict between obligations under the Rome Statute to cooperate with the 
ICC and obligations to respect immunities under customary international law, 
due to Bashir’s travel into their territory. The three-panel Pre-trial Chamber 
(PTC) of the ICC, since August 2010, has issued decisions on non-
cooperation, including referrals to the Assembly of States (ASP) and the 
UNSC, pursuant to the Rome Statute. Decisions have been issued against 
seven State Parties, a majority of them being African States.7 One of its latest 
decisions, in July 2017, concerned South Africa’s failure to arrest Bashir 
when he attended the African Union (AU) heads of summit meeting in 
Johannesburg in June 2015. This decision led protests by several African 
States, who have accused the ICC of bias against them. The PTC found that 
States Parties to the Rome Statute, such as South Africa, are required to arrest 
and surrender Bashir to the ICC when he is found in their territory. This 
holds even though Sudan is not a party to the ICC – thereby effectively 
overriding any immunity that Bashir may otherwise enjoy as Head of State 
under customary international law, and giving the Rome Statute and UNSC 
resolutions priority. In response, there have been threats by many African 
states to withdraw from the ICC, and some have taken steps to do so. These 
political issues may be part of the resistance to cooperate with the Court in 
arresting Bashir.  
 
Providing justice for the horrendous crimes committed in Darfur is important 
but the rules of international law must be respected. It is uncertain how treaty 
rules contained in the Rome Statute and in the UN Charter interact with 
personal Head of State immunity provided under customary international 
law. Thus, how such interaction effects the obligations for State Parties stated 
in the Rome Statute. The inconsistency of legal regimes makes international 
law and the practice by the ICC, as well as international relations, unstable. 
Therefore, this thesis intends to contribute to the scholarly debate on the 
subject by clarifying the obligations for State Parties under the Rome Statute 
concerning request to arrest a Head of State of a non-party, who face 
                                                
5 Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009 
(Bashir First Arrest Warrant); Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar  
Hassan Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 12 July 2010, (Bashir Second Arrest Warrant). 
6 See Rome Statute art. 63. 
7 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09-109, 13 December 2011 
(Decision against Chad); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09-
139, 13 December 2011(Decision against Malawi); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, 9 April 2014 (Decision against DRC); Prosecutor v. Al 
Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/05-01/09-266, 11 July 2016 (Decision against 
Djibouti); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/05-01/09-267, 11 July 
2016 (Decision against Uganda); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/05-
01/09-302, 6 July 2017 (Decision against South Africa); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, ICC-02/05-01/09-309, 11 December 2017 (Decision against Jordan). 
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prosecution pursuant to a UNSC referral, with regards to States obligations 
under customary international law to respect immunities of Heads of State. 
1.2 Purpose of the thesis and research 
questions  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the concept of Head of State 
immunity and the obligation States have to respect such immunity. Immunity 
rules under customary international law shall be discussed in relation to State 
Party obligations pursuant to the Rome Statute to disregard such immunity 
when the ICC seeks to arrest an incumbent Head of State. The purpose 
includes clarifying which legal regime applies with regards to the allegedly 
conflicting obligations when a situation is before the ICC pursuant to a 
UNSC referral. As such, the interactions between international legal regimes, 
namely the Rome Statute, the UN Charter and customary international law, 
will be of focus. 
 
The purpose also includes providing for suggestions for a legal rationale 
solution to the inconsistent obligations for State Parties to the Rome Statute 
and its obligation under customary international law to respect immunities. In 
order to combat the persistence of the legal issues at hand, the thesis shall 
discuss how to give effect in the international community to the most 
appropriate legal rational. 
 
In order to satisfy the stated purpose, this thesis will enlarge on the following 
research questions. The primary research question is formulated as follows: 
 
• To what extent must State Parties to the Rome Statute uphold the 
personal immunity that Heads of State enjoy under customary 
international law, when faced with a request by the ICC for arrest and 
surrender of a Head of State of a non-party? Are State Parties 
required, on the basis of a UNSC referral of a situation to the ICC, to 
disregard its obligation under customary international law not to 
violate a Head of State’s right to immunity? 
 
To answer the primary research question, some secondary research questions 
are necessary. The secondary research questions are formulated as follows:  
 
• What is the legal rationale and accompanying state obligations 
regarding personal Head of State immunity governed by international 
customary law? 
 
• What is the legal rationale and accompanying state obligations 
regarding personal Head of State immunity before international 
criminal courts and tribunals?  
 
• What is the legal effect of a UNSC resolution referring a situation to 
the ICC?  
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• What is the legal rationale and accompanying state obligations 
regarding personal Head of State immunity before the ICC? 
Specifically, what is the scope of application of, and relationship 
between art. 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute? 
1.3 Methodology and perspective 
1.3.1 Methodology  
The main focus of the thesis is the legal rationale concerning obligations of 
State Parties to the Rome Statute under the Statute and customary 
international law, as well as the effect of a UNSC referral to the Court. As a 
starting point, the thesis assumes inconsistency between obligations for State 
Parties under the Rome Statute to comply with the ICC’s requests for 
cooperation and its obligation under customary international law to respect 
immunities. To examine the international law, which generates this 
inconsistency, the author has opted for a legal dogmatic method combined 
with international legal doctrine.  
 
The purpose of legal dogmatic method is often described as reconstructing 
the solution of a legal problem, often posed as a concrete research question, 
by applying a rule to it. The basis of doing so is the principles of the 
commonly accepted sources of law according to the hierarchy of norms.8 
Here is where the international legal doctrine applies. With regard to 
international law, according to art. 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice9 (ICJ Statute), the recognised sources of law are treaties and 
conventions, international custom, general principles of law, and subsidiary 
sources such as judicial decisions and legal teachings.10 The thesis is based 
on concrete research questions and guidance shall be searched for within the 
sources of international law. 
 
Crucially, neither legal dogmatic method nor international legal doctrine 
provides for a genuine solution of norm conflict in international law. As such, 
no centralised system with a developed hierarchy based on sources of norms 
exists.11 In domestic law, a constitutional norm will prevail over a statutory 
one, while legislation will ordinarily prevail over executive orders or decrees. 
In international law, all sources of law are generally considered to be equal.12 
There have been efforts to solve different conflicts of norms in international 
law. However, although a treaty usually prevails over custom, this is only so 
because the customary rule is jus dispositivum, meaning that it can be 
contracted out of, and applies only by default if the parties in question have 
                                                
8 Fredric Korling, Mauro Zamboni (ed.), Juridisk metodlära, (1. edition, Studentlitteratur, 
Lund, 2013) 24. 
9 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946 (ICJ Statute) 
10 See also Malcolm David Evans, (ed.), International law, (4. ed., 2014, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2014) 91. 
11 Evans (n. 10) 145. 
12 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of norms in public international law: how WTO law relates to 
other rules of international law, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 94-96. 
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not agreed differently.13 However, a treaty is also jus dispositivum and can 
equally be amended or abrogated by subsequent treaty or custom. In 
international law, the only true instance of hierarchy is the very limited 
number of jus cogens norms, e.g. prohibition of genocide or prohibition of 
torture. Such norms invalidate any other conflicting norm. However, such 
invalidation can only be superseded by a subsequent norm of equal status.14  
 
As such, as legal dogmatic method confirms, the examination and 
interpretation of the sources of law will be of focus. The Vienna Convention 
on the law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) is part of the international legal 
doctrine, and will be applied when interpretation is needed. As can be read in 
Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. Thus, the 
purpose of the treaty needs to be derived from the treaty as a whole. 
Teleological interpretations have been recognised both in international 
rulings and in relation to the Rome Statute and the UN Charter.15 
 
Legal dogmatic method was chosen due to the complicated nature of the legal 
questions presented in the research questions. A credible legal analysis 
requires the highest degree of devotion to the legal material. A legal dogmatic 
analysis intends to analyse the relevant sources of law so that the result can 
be assumed to reflect the established law, or how the relevant rule should be 
perceived in a given context. This thesis concentrates on the interpretation of 
de lege lata, including how the law has been interpreted and applied thus far. 
Different approaches and rationales to the legal questions at issue are put 
forward. As there are many interpretations, it is important to give effect of the 
most appropriate legal rationale. Therefore, this thesis will also discuss 
solutions to give this effect. 
 
A flaw with the legal dogmatic method is that it prevents an examination of 
the relationship between the political and legal dimension of international 
law. Even if the thesis’ main focus is the legal rationale of the issues arising 
under international law, these issues are part of international political issues. 
The author hopes to mitigate this flaw by including a historical and political 
perspective, describing how the law has developed through historical events 
and political decisions and relations, thereby placing the legal issues in a 
political context. 
1.3.2 Perspective  
Public international law is founded on historical events and political 
decisions made by states throughout history in the international society. Each 
legal regime is a historical phenomenon, developed through events in the 
                                                
13 Alfred Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law’, (1966) 60(1) 
Am J Int'l L 55, 58. 
14 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 331 (Vienna Convention) art. 53, 64. See also Pauwelyn (n. 12) 
278-82. 
15 Bruno Simma and others (red.), The Charter of the United Nations: a commentary (Vol. 1, 
3. ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2012) 31. 
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international society.16 Though the issue of focus is the legal rationale of 
obligations related to immunities and the practice by the ICC, the historical 
and political context must be studied in order to completely understand such 
legal issues. The solutions to these issues may also have an effect on 
international relations as well as the practice of the ICC. Consequently, it 
appears natural for the thesis to include both a historical and political 
perspective, to explain the international legal development in order to analyse 
and constitute the appropriate interpretation of de lege lata. 
 
However, as mentioned above, a historical and political approach can be said 
to conflict with the constitution of legal dogmatic method and the 
international legal doctrine. A strict legal analysis contradicts the rationale of 
the historical and political perspective, as it fails to present the factual 
circumstances behind the making and application of law. In the end however, 
these perspectives will benefit in providing the most appropriate 
interpretation of the international law of focus. This outweighed the created 
conflict between the historical and political description and the legal analysis. 
The historical and political perspective will permeate the thesis as a whole. In 
particular, the relationship between African states and the ICC, as well as the 
role of the UNSC and the ASP will be addressed continuously throughout the 
thesis. 
1.4 Material  
1.4.1 Sources  
To fully comply with legal dogmatic method and the international legal 
doctrine, the primary material being researched for this thesis are sources of 
international law, as outlined above, and defined in art. 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute. The primary sources constitute the applicable law of the complex 
problems presented and the main sources providing appropriate conclusions 
of the research questions. 
 
The concept of Head of State immunity and the state obligations associated to 
it is, to a large extent, based on customary international law, as raised from 
state practice and opinio juris. Therefore, relevant case law will be a main 
focus and will examine the research questions related to immunities and 
states obligation under customary international law.  
 
Concerning Head of State immunity before international courts and tribunals, 
the Charter of the United Nations17 (UN Charter), the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal18 (Nuremberg Charter), the Statute of the 
International Tribunal of former Yugoslavia19 (ICTY Statute), the Statute of 
                                                
16 Robert Kolb, Theory of International Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2016) 44. 
17 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, (UN Charter). 
18 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement 
for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axix, 8 
August 1945 (Nuremberg Charter). 
19 UNSC, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as 
amended on 17 May 2002), 25 May 1993 (ICTY Statute). 
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the International Tribunal for Rwanda20 (ICTR Statute), and the Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone21 (SCSL Statute), as well as case law from 
these Tribunals and Courts will be examined and interpreted. 
 
As outlined above, the Rome Statute governs the ICC, therefore, the 
interpretation of the Statute will be of main focus examining the research 
questions concerning the Court and State Party’s obligations under the Rome 
Statute. Moreover, the decisions on non-cooperation issued by the PTC will 
be analysed. Since the ICC practice in the Bashir case is a result of a UNSC 
referral, UN law and practice are also primary sources. Specifically, 
interpretation of Resolution 1593, thus referring the situation in Darfur to the 
ICC, is crucial.  
 
As all the aforementioned treaties must be interpreted, the Vienna 
Convention is part of the primary sources, as well as legal literature 
discussing the interpretation of these treaties. 
 
For the sake of arguments with regard to the legal rationale, and followed the 
historical and political perspective of this thesis, as well for the sake of 
discussion, both academic and political sources will be included. Such 
sources include legal literature, articles, historical documents, political 
statements, and discussions. Particularly these sources will be used when the 
legal doctrine fails to offer a conclusive answer to a question. Moreover, 
when available, multiple sources will be utilised. 
1.4.2 Source criticism  
The legal issues that will be discussed in this thesis include issues of political 
nature. Political opinions and personal interests can exist without influencing 
the professional works of academics. However, the author of the thesis has 
closely examined the authors of scholarly contributions on the subject and 
utilised multiple sources where available and appropriate. Above all, 
academia has played an important role on the subject. 
 
Part of writing on a controversial subject is being aware of personal opinions 
that could risk negatively affecting the contents and the result of the thesis. It 
is difficult to have a lack of opinion on one of the most controversial legal 
issues of this time. The author has tried to mitigate these problems through 
constant awareness regarding the separation of personal opinion from legal 
analysis and close scrutiny of the material included in the thesis, in order to 
contribute to the thesis with an objective mind set. 
1.5 Previous research 
Countless of academic articles offer differing legal conclusions to the issues 
of international immunities and practice by the ICC, specifically regarding 
the case of Bashir.  
                                                
20 UNSC, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 13 
October 2006), 8 November 1994 (ICTR Statute). 
21 UNSC, Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, (SCSL Statute). 
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An example of more recent articles includes ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy 
Immunity from Arrest.’ 22, by Paola Gaeta, who argues that the UNSC referral 
only triggers the jurisdiction of the ICC and does not make the Rome Statute 
implicitly applicable to the situation in Darfur. She argues customary 
international law on personal immunities is not applicable when the ICC 
exercises its jurisdiction. However, she argues the Rome Statute continues to 
only bind State Parties to the treaty unless the UNSC expressly requires UN 
Member States to comply with requests issued by the ICC.23 As such Gaeta 
distinguishes between exercise of jurisdiction and judicial orders. The State 
Parties cannot lawfully disregard personal immunities under customary 
international law, thus, are not obligated to comply with the request to 
arrest.24 
 
Another example of a recent article is ‘The Security Council Referral and 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’25 by Dapo Akande, who 
argues that the UNSC Resolution 1593 implicitly adopts the provisions of the 
Rome Statute, rendering them binding on Sudan as obligations under UN law 
because the UNSC acts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, 
State Parties to the Rome Statute are obligated to arrest Bashir pursuant to the 
Rome Statute.26  
 
In addition, some scholars argue a new rule of customary law, removing 
immunity before international courts, has developed. This would mean no 
Head of State is protected by immunity before international courts, including 
the ICC.27 
 
In summary, although to some extent dependent on the circumstances in the 
Bashir case, the scholarly debate has resulted in at least three lines of 
arguments reflecting on differing legal rationales for State Parties obligations 
under the Rome Statute with regards to arrest a Head of State of a non-party 
subjected to jurisdiction pursuant to a UNSC referral: 1) the rules of 
customary international law on personal immunity applies with regards to 
State Parties’ obligation, but not with regards to jurisdiction28 2) a UNSC 
referral implicitly adopts the provisions of the Rome Statue binding on a non-
                                                
22 Paola Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest’, (2009) 7 JICJ, 315. 
23 Gaeta ‘Immunity from Arrest’ (n. 22) 332. 
24 Gaeta ‘Immunity from Arrest’ (n. 22) 319, 332. 
25 Dapo Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact 
on Al Bashir's Immunities’, (2009) 7 JICJ, 333–352. 
26 Akande ‘Legal Nature of UNSC Referrals’ (n. 25) 340-342. 
27 Sophie Papillon, ‘Has the United Nations Security Council Implicitly Removed Al Bashir's 
Immunity’, (2010) 10 Int'l Crim. L. Rev. 275; Antonio Cassese International criminal law, 
(2. ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) 311-312; Claus Kreß, Kimberly Prost 
‘Article 98’ in Otto Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observer's Notes, Article by Article (2nd ed, Verlag C. H. Beck oHG, 
Minchen, 2008) 1601. 
28 Gaeta ‘Immunity from Arrest’ (n. 22) 332.  
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party to the Rome Statute pursuant to UN law29 3) A new rule of customary 
law removes immunity of Heads of States before international courts.30 
 
Considering the latest legal and political development there can be no serious 
debate that the question of personal immunity remains one of the most 
pressing issues before the ICC. While the PTC decisions may have the 
answer to the arising legal questions, it cannot pretend to be the last word on 
the matter. Certainly, it is not considered as such by several State Parties. 
Bashir will continue to travel inside and outside of State Parties and will 
avoid prosecution. Consequently, the issue of immunities and the ICC is 
highly relevant to further analyse. The aforementioned scholarly 
contributions are written prior to the latest PTC decision on non-cooperation 
in the Bashir case. Accordingly, new decisions have been issued, affecting 
the debate of the most appropriate legal rationale and its effect. Arguments 
made by the aforementioned scholars will be discussed in great detail 
throughout this thesis, as well as other contributions to the scholarly debate. 
1.6 Delimitations and clarifications 
As this thesis will analyse issues that are part of a larger and more complex 
issue, involving several legal and political concerns, delimitations have been 
made in order to provide the focus required. 
 
International law includes several different rationales for immunity. This 
thesis will solely review the concept of Head of State immunity. In addition, 
personal immunity will be the primary focus here; hence, functional 
immunity will be briefly explained to give a better understanding of personal 
immunity. Personal immunity before national courts will be evaluated, but 
the focus here will be personal Head of State immunity before international 
courts, specifically, the ICC. Concerning other international courts and 
tribunals, the focus will be given to the practice by the ICJ, Nuremberg 
Tribunal, ICTY, ICTR and SCSL as personal Head of State immunity has 
been addressed by these bodies.  
 
Moreover, it has been debated if international crimes should be considered as 
an official or private act. Since this thesis solely concentrates on personal 
immunity of an incumbent Head of State, which protect State Officials from 
prosecution of both official and private acts, this question will not be further 
addressed. 
 
The Rome Statute consists of 128 complex provisions. This thesis will focus 
on the provisions governing Head of State immunity and obligations for State 
Parties to cooperate with the Court. However, to give a full understanding of 
the issues at stake, conditions for the Court’s jurisdiction will be explained. 
 
                                                
29 Akande ‘Legal Nature of UNSC Referrals’ (n. 25) 333; Dan Terzian, ‘Personal Immunity 
and President Omar Al Bashir: An Analysis under Customary International Law and Security 
Council Resolution 1593’, (2011) 16 UCLA J. Int'l L. Foreign Aff. 279, 309. 
30 Papillon (n. 27) 275; Cassese, Int. Criminal Law (n. 27) 311-312; Kreß & Prost (n. 27) 
1601. 
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In total, the PTC has issued eight decisions against seven State Parties on 
non-cooperation; four of these decisions will be reviewed. Four of the 
decisions, namely the decisions against Djibouti, Uganda and two decisions 
against Chad lack of relevant arguments regarding Head of State immunity. 
Djibouti, Uganda and Chad mainly argued that Bashir is protected by 
immunity because of Sudan’s membership in the AU. Regional and domestic 
law, including AU law, will not be reviewed. These decisions are not relevant 
with regard to the purpose and research questions of this thesis. 
 
The decisions against Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South 
Africa and the Jordan will be evaluated and analysed. Malawi and DRC also 
lack relevant argumentation of international law; however, these decisions 
are important to illustrate a change of legal rationale by the PTC. South Arica 
and Jordan also include irrelevant arguments for the scope of the thesis. 
However, with regard to obligations under the Rome Statute and Head of 
State immunity only relevant arguments and court analysis will be analysed. 
 
For clarification, when referring to Head of State, the term includes Head of 
Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs. There is no definition of Head 
of State under customary international law, but its been clarified in practice 
and treaties the term includes the mentioned titles.31  
1.7 Structure  
In order to provide a logical line of arguments that answer the primary 
research question and provides for the thesis’ conclusions, the author has 
chosen to structure the thesis according to the secondary research questions. 
All chapters will continuously provide interpretation and discussion of the 
legal regimes offered by judicial actors and legal commentators. The last 
section of each chapter will provide the author’s analysis.  
 
Chapter two will analyse the development of customary international law on 
immunities. This chapter aims to constitute de lege lata and its place in 
international law by reviewing the development of the legal regime. 
 
Chapter three will analyse the development of personal immunity before 
international criminal tribunals and courts. This chapter aims to determine 
how personal immunity with regards to jurisdiction and judicial orders has 
been applied by international criminal tribunals and courts. This will provide 
analogous or e contratio interpretation with regards to personal immunity 
before the ICC. 
 
                                                
31 See for example UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14 
December 1973, art. 1(1)(a); Arthur Watts, ‘The Legal Position in International Law of 
Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers’, (1994) 274 Recueil des 
Cours, 21; Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Belgium), International Court of Justice, 14 February 2002, para 51 (Arrest 
Warrant Case). 
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Chapter four will analyse personal Head of State immunity and State Parties’ 
obligations under the Rome Statute. This chapter will mainly describe the 
legal framework of the Statute as it must be explained to understand the legal 
problems provided in the research questions. However, it will analyse, to 
some extent, the drafting procedure of the Rome Statute in order to provide 
for teleological interpretation of its provision.  
 
Chapter five will analyse the Bashir case, specifically concentrating on the 
non-cooperation decisions issued by the PTC and State Parties’ reaction to 
these decisions. Of focus for the analysis are the legal effect of Resolution 
1593 and the scope of art. 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute, as well as the 
credibility of the PTC’s legal rationale.  
 
Chapter six will deliver the final analysis of the thesis. By drawing upon the 
analysis of each chapter, it will analyse the different parameters of the legal 
rationale and provide an answer to the primary research question. With this 
legal rationale, will come future reflections, and lastly the conclusions of this 
thesis.  
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2 Head of State immunity under 
customary international law 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter two will explain and analyse the development of international 
customary law governing Head of State immunity. The purpose of this 
chapter is to determine the aims of Head of State immunity and its place in 
international law by discussing its development through state practice and 
doctrine.  
 
Head of State immunity derives from State immunity; hence, the chapter will 
initially introduce the development of State immunity. The purpose here is to 
provide the reader with a background and deeper understanding of Head of 
State immunity. Additionally, recent developments and the current state of 
law concerning Head of State immunity will then be discussed. The 
development of both State immunity and Head of State immunity include 
many conflicting interpretations and opinions, both with regards to state 
practice and academia, which will be discussed in each section. 
2.2 State immunity  
2.2.1 Absolute immunity doctrine to restrictive 
immunity doctrine 
Immunity rules are generally well established in international law as a 
possible hindrance to prosecuting international crimes.32 State immunity was 
first created to ensure sovereign equality between states and non-
interference.33 During the 19th century, the theory of absolute immunity was 
sustainably accepted and upheld.34 The concept of this theory derived from 
the Latin Maxim par in parem non habet imperium according to which all 
states are equally sovereign, thus, have no right to exercise jurisdiction 
against each other.35 Accordingly, the sovereign state has jurisdiction over its 
territory and its citizens. Therefore, regardless of circumstances, no state may 
claim superiority or exercise jurisdiction over another state, and foreign states 
enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of other states. A 
consequence of the theory of absolute immunity is that all acts of a state are 
granted immunity by the domestic courts of other states. 36 
 
                                                
32 Arrest Warrant case (n. 31), para 51. 
33  Yang (n. 3) 7. 
34 Rosanna Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International 
Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law, (Oxford University Press. 2008) 13. 
35 Jurisdictional Immunities of State, Germany v. Italy, Judgment ICGJ 434 (ICJ 2012), 3 
February 2012, International Court of Justice, (Germany v. Italy), para 57. 
36 Malcolm N. Shaw, International law, (Eighth edition., Cambridge, 2017) 494. 
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The principle par in parem non habet imperium was significantly present in 
one of the first judgments, from 1812, expressing the rule of State immunity; 
the Schooner Exchange v. McFadden37. The Schooner Exchange influenced 
the law of State immunity since it was one of the first cases confirming that 
states should be protected from foreign jurisdiction.38 Chief Justice 
Marshall’s explanation of the rationale of State immunity stated:  
 
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being 
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity 
of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the 
jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a sovereign territory 
only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities 
belonging to his independent sovereign status, though not expressly 
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.39 
 
The Schooner Exchange became renowned because of this quote, in which 
Marshall does not address any exceptions to immunity, hence, representing 
absolute immunity. Comity and reciprocal treatment meant sovereigns were 
hesitant to assert jurisdiction over other sovereigns.40 As monarchs gave way 
to the sovereign nation-state, sovereign immunity was transferred to politics. 
Considerations of foreign policy and domestic protection justified applying 
the rule of immunity to the state.41  
 
However, scholarly writing and jurisprudence are divided in their 
understanding of the Schooner Exchange. The absolute doctrine was not 
universally accepted, even during Marshall’s time.42 Courts in Italy and 
Belgium rejected the absolute doctrine as early as the late nineteenth century, 
by adopting an exception for private acts. Several other states followed 
shortly thereafter.43 As such, the transition from the absolute immunity theroy 
to the restrictive immunity theory began, and occurred gradually over a long 
period of time.  
 
Modern critique against the absolute doctrine includes that it recognises the 
time when personal sovereigns were indeed above the law within their own 
states. The rationale is seen to have no deeper roots than the reciprocal 
interests of States in preventing interference with each other’s basic 
governmental activities.44 The Schooner Exchange has not only been referred 
                                                
37 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, (1812) 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116. 
38 Rosanna Van Alebeek, ‘National Courts, international Crimes, and the Functional 
immunity of state officials’, (2012) Neth, Intl L Rev 59:5-41,12. 
39 Alebeek, Immunity (n. 34) 137. 
40 See Elihu Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States’ 
(1951) 28 Brit YB Int'l L 220, 220-221. 
41 Lauterpacht (n. 40) 220-221. 
42 Jasper Finke, ‘Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity, or Something Else?’, (2010) 21 EJIL. 
853, 858-60. 
43 Alebeek, ‘National Courts’ (n. 38) 14-15. 
44 Myres S. McDougal, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Some Suggested 
Amendments’, in Martha L. Landwehr, Private Investors Abroad – Problems and Solutions 
in Internaitonal Business in 1981 4, 4 (Martha L. Landwehr ed., 1981), 11. 
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to as a source of absolute immunity, but also under the assumption that 
immunity is granted as a matter of courtesy and not as a matter of law.45 
 
In 1950, after a comprehensive survey of state practice in the case of Dralle 
v. Republic of Czechoslovakia46, the Supreme Court of Austria found that a 
foreign state could only be protected from Austrian jurisdiction for the acts of 
a sovereign character.47 A few years later, in the 1963 Claim Against the 
Empire of Iran Case48, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that 
absolute immunity was no longer a rule of customary international law. In the 
same case, the Court presented a distinction between sovereign acts (acta 
jure imperii) and non-sovereign acts (acta jure gestionis).49 
 
The restrictive immunity doctrine was developed as a response to 
developments in the international community, specifically, the increase of 
state trading, and other activities in foreign countries.50 Developments in 
immunity rules were argued as necessary because they would render states 
unjust business advantages if they were immune from the jurisdiction of 
foreign state’s jurisdiction. The rationale entailed State immunity should only 
be granted in matters when necessary for the states to fulfil their functions. 
Eventually, an increasing number of states started to adopt the restrictive 
immunity approach.51 
 
Today, the restrictive doctrine is accepted as the prevailing doctrine.52 For 
example, this is indicated in the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and their Property53, adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in 2004, which list exceptions to State immunity.54 
 
However, even now that the restrictive doctrine enjoys widespread support, 
various national courts and legislation understands the doctrine differently. 
According to some scholars, the distinction between sovereign and non-
sovereign acts is crucial to the present law of State immunity.55 The 
distinction is only theoretical, and provides that sovereign acts are 
characterised by the fact that they are exercised by the sovereign powers of a 
state, and non-sovereign acts are performed by the state as a person.56 Such 
                                                
45 Lee Caplan, ‘State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative 
Hierarchy Theory’, (2003) 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 741, 748; See also Svrine Knuchel, ‘State 
Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens’, (2011) 9 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 149. 
46 OGH 1 Ob 171/50 (Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia), 10 May 1950, SZ 1950 No. 
23/143, 304-332; 17 ILR 155, Austria Supreme Court. 
47 August Reinisch, Peter Bachmayer, ‘Identification of Customary International Law by 
Austrian Courts’ (2012) 17 Austrian Rev Int'l & Eur L 1, 10. 
48 Empire of Iran, German Federal Constitutional Court, 45 ILR 57 (1963). 
49 Shaw (n. 36) 494; Anders Henriksen, International law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2017) 105. 
50 Yang (n. 3) 19. 
51 Shaw (n. 36) 491. 
52 Shaw (n. 36) 499. 
53 UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional immunities of States 
and their Property, 2 December 2004, (Convention on Jurisdictional immunities). 
54 See Convention on Jurisdictional immunities art. 18 and 19. 
55 Hazel Fox, Philippa Webb, The law of state immunity, (Revised and updated Third 
edition., Oxford, United Kingdom, 2015) 22. 
56 Fox & Webb (n. 55) 22. 
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distinction has been criticised because it could be argued that any state act is 
carried out for public purposes.57 In addition, different standards exist 
regarding how to determine the private or public nature of an act, and the 
context in which this distinction should be applied is also uncertain. So far, 
state practice so far has been varying.58 
2.3 Recent developments of Head of State 
immunity  
2.3.1 Individual criminal responsibility and 
irrelevence of capacity 
The development of State immunity has reflected the development of Head of 
State immunity. Head of State originally benefited from immunity based on 
the absolute identification between the state and its leader. As such, the 
absolute State immunity was vested in the Head of State. Approaching the 
restrictive doctrine, the Head of State could be protected by immunity for 
sovereign acts. However, after World War II the Nuremberg trials made it 
clear that high-ranking State Officials could be held individually responsible 
for crimes committed while in office.59 Nevertheless, rules governing 
immunity have continuously developed in customary international law to 
prevent abusive criminal proceedings against State Officials.60 
 
In recent decades, the boundaries of immunity and accountability under 
international law have been under intense scrutiny. Broad legal fictions such 
as the representative theory, have been rationalised, thus, functional necessity 
is currently the most demonstrative explanation for immunity in international 
customary law.61 Consequently, international law considers the rights given 
to a Head of State as accorded to him or her in the capacity as highest 
representatives of their State, rather than inherently in their own right.62 
Significant key developments in international criminal law have been the 
driving forces behind to the re-evaluation of immunity principles.63  
 
International criminal law is a relatively new and unique international law 
regime.64 It has developed by gradual accretion from international 
                                                
57 Fox & Webb (n. 55) 399, 402. 
58 Finke (n. 42) 858-60. 
59 Lucas Buzzard, ‘Holding an Arsonist's Feet to the Fire? - The Legality and Enforceability 
of the ICC's Arrest Warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir’, (2009) 24 Am U Int'l L 
Rev 879, 912-913. 
60 Steffen Wirth, ‘Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgment in the Congo v. Belgium 
Case’ (2002) 13 EJIL, 877, 882. 
61 Chanaka Wickremasinghe, ‘Immunities Enjoyed by Officials of States and International 
Organisations’ in Malcolm D Evans (ed) International Law (2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2006) 395, 396; Craig Barker, International Law and International Relations, 
(Continuum, London, 2000), 164. 
62 Watts (n. 31) 35-36. 
63 Cassese, Int. Criminal Law (n. 27) 307; Robert Cryer, ‘The ICC and the Security Council: 
An Uncomfortable Relationship’ in José Doria, and others (ed) The Legal Regime of the 
International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009) 422, 455. 
64 Cassese, Int. Criminal Law (n. 27) 4. 
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humanitarian law, human rights law and national criminal law.65 International 
criminal law focus upon the individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes. Thus, unlike international law in general, which 
typically governs the rights and obligations of states and relations between 
states.66 International criminal law introduces a fundamental challenge to 
immunity for international crimes as the perpetrators of such crimes are often 
State Officials who have enjoyed immunity throughout history.67 
International criminal law encompasses substantive rules defining crimes and 
liability, and procedural rules, which regulate international criminal 
proceedings.68 
 
The notion of individual criminal responsibility is central to international 
criminal law.69 The concept that individuals are only subject to the criminal 
jurisdiction belonging to their States has been progressively rejected and 
states have slowly shifted towards claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction for 
international crimes.70 The crucial turning point for this concept was the 
international Military Tribunals of Nuremberg. The tribunal were provided 
with jurisdiction to prosecute low-ranking servicemen, senior State Agents of 
military command as well as political leaders for crimes committed during 
the World War II.71 As the infamous quote from the Nuremberg Tribunal 
states: ‘Crimes against International Law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes 
can the provisions of International Law be enforced’.72 
 
The development of the principle of irrelevance of official capacity has been 
equally important to individual criminal responsibility. Historically, senior 
State Officials have been able to assert their official position as a defence to 
individual responsibility for international crimes.73 Art. 7 of the Nuremberg 
Charter explicitly states that defendant’s official position will not free them 
from responsibility; ‘The official position of defendants, whether Heads of 
State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be 
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment’.74  
 
The provision, known as the Nuremberg formula, has served as a blueprint on 
the issue of individual criminal responsibility for all international tribunals 
and courts to be established. On 11 December 1946, the UNGA unanimously 
adopted Resolution 95, which affirmed the principles.75 The principles have 
been endorsed in the Statutes of for example the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and 
                                                
65 Cassese, Int. Criminal Law (n. 27) 6-7. 
66 Cryer (n. 63) 1. 
67 Kreß and Prost (n. 27) 1608. 
68 Cassese, Int. Criminal Law (n. 27) 3. 
69 Ciara Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes 
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ICC. In the Eichmann case,76 the Supreme Court of Israel noted that the 
principles reflect customary international law.77 The latter has also been 
stated by other domestic Courts, ICTY and addressed during the negotiations 
of art. 27 of the Rome Statute.78 
2.3.2 Normative hierarchy doctrine 
Influenced by international criminal law and international human rights law, 
a new theory for Head of State immunity has derived to solve the conflict 
between norms of Head of State immunity and norms constituting 
accountability for international crimes. The theory implies that jurisdictional 
immunity is no longer applicable if states breach fundamental norms of 
international law considered as jus cogens norms.79 As such, Heads of States 
can be held responsible for such violations. The underlying rationale is that 
certain norms, such as international crimes, rank higher in hierarchy than 
immunity of Head of State because the latter is not considered a jus cogens 
norm.80 
 
The idea that sovereign immunity must yield to fundamental human rights 
violations was first applied by the United States (U.S.) District Court in the 
Princz case81, however, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit 
overruled the judgment.82 It was not until the Corte di Cassazione of Italy 
delivered its judgment in Ferrini v. Germany83, that a state’s highest court 
had ever embraced the theory, explicitly stating:  
 
Such rights are protected by norms, from which no derogation is 
permitted, which lie at the heart of the international order and prevail 
over all conventional and customary norms, including those, which 
relate to State immunity. […] The recognition of immunity from 
jurisdiction […] for such misdeeds stand in stark contrast to [this] […] 
analysis, in that such recognition does not assist, but rather impedes, 
the protection of those norms and principles […] There is no doubt that 
a contradiction between two equally binding legal norms ought to be 
resolved by giving precedence of the norm with the highest status.84 
 
In promoting the normative hierarchy theory, it has been argued that 
international law is gravitating from a system focused on states and 
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sovereignty to a system focused on people and human rights.85 Moreover, 
although in separate or dissenting opinions, Judges of international courts 
have argued for the normative hierarchy theory.86 For example in Judge Awb 
Sgawkat Al-Khassawneh’s dissenting opinion in the Arrest Warrant case he 
stressed that the move towards greater accountability for international crimes 
and increased recognition of the need to effectively combat such crimes are 
vital community values that require hierarchically higher norms to override 
any rules of immunity. This argument is consistent with art. 53 of the Vienna 
Convention which states that treaties may be void if they conflict with pre-
emptory norms of international law. In addition, many academics support his 
argument.87 However, Al-Khasawneh acknowledged that the idea of 
fundamental norms overriding immunity was at a ‘very nebulous stage of 
development’.88 
 
The reasoning made by Corte di Cassazione has been criticised to simplify 
the concept of jus cogens and its consequences on non-jus cogens norms of 
international law.89 A consensus in the debate is that jus cogens is a valid 
category of norms in international law, but much else is disputed. For 
example, how to determine which norms have acquired the status of jus 
cogens and which practical consequences the normative hierarchy theory 
generates.90 
 
One of the many particularities of the critique is a basic assumption which 
many scholars and judges consider has not been seriously questioned; 
fundamental human rights, like the prohibition of torture and crimes against 
humanity are part of jus coges whereas sovereign immunity, even though a 
legally binding rule, belongs to non-jus cogens norms.91 This view reveals a 
substantive understanding focusing on the basic values of the international 
community. In contrast to a more formal perception, this view emphasises the 
protection of the most fundamental human rights, thereby strengthening the 
position of the individual vis-à-vis the Sate.92 The more formal perception 
includes rules that are inherent to the function of the international legal 
system, e.g. pacta sunt servanda and the sovereign equality and 
independence of states.93 It is argued that if one should accept a more state-
centred concept of jus cogens and that sovereign immunity is directly based 
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on such sovereignty, it is much more difficult to argue that sovereign 
immunity is not part of jus cogens.94 
 
Moreover, another problem discussed is that even if most treaties consist of 
an existing peremptory norm of general international law95, it is argued and 
far from settled that this specific consequence applies outside conflicting 
treaty obligations involving jus cogens.96 Specifically, the clash between 
fundamental human rights and sovereign immunity is argued to be a clash of 
concepts and ideologies, not of norms. A conflict of norms would require that 
legal consequences of two norms are incompatible with each other. It is also 
argued that this requirement is not met as the truisms of international law are 
the existence of a rule and its enforcement are two different sets of 
problems.97 Sovereign immunity is argued as an exception to adjudicatory 
jurisdiction, hence concerning enforcement matters, not the identification of 
an unlawful act as a human rights violation.98 This would require the 
existence of a rule considering a jus cogens norm, because of its value, 
invaliding rules limiting its enforcement, which according to critics, does not 
and will not exist.99 
2.4 Current state of Head of State 
immunity  
2.4.1 The rationale for Head of State immunity 
Customary international law governs Head of State immunity and no 
definition of this immunity exists thereunder. The notion of Head of State 
immunity emerged as a personal protection from the jurisdiction of foreign 
states. However, developments in international customary law provide that 
immunity is not vested in the Head of State personally, but belongs to the 
state. The independence of the state and the protection of the ability of its 
prime representatives to carry out international functions prevent one state 
from exercising jurisdiction over the Head of State of another state without 
the latter’s consent.100 
 
Justification for Head of State immunity can historically be divided into two 
main groups: the representative character theory and the functional necessity 
theory.101 
 
The representative character theory originates from when the Head of State in 
person was very close to the state. According to the theory, the immunity is 
to be traced to the sovereignty of the state. In conjunction with the previously 
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mentioned par in parem non habet imperium, this theory formed the 
foundation upon which the early rules of Head of State immunity rested.102 
 
The functional necessity theory emerged during the 20th century as a 
development from the representative character theory. It is based on the 
rationale that Heads of States need immunity from jurisdiction of other states 
in order to conduct their work. The immunity itself is tied to the act 
performed, not to the individual performing it. The theory of functional 
necessity is currently considered to be the rationale for Head of State 
immunity.103  
2.4.2 Concepts of Head of State immunity 
2.4.2.1 Functional immunity  
Functional immunity (immunity rationae materiae) attaches to official acts 
and provides former State Officials with a substantive defence for acts carried 
out in an official capacity on behalf of the state. As such, acts are attributed to 
the state, not the individual, and immunity is provided because of the official 
character of the act itself. Functional immunity derives from the principle of 
sovereign equality: one sovereign state cannot, in its own court of law, call 
into questions the acts of another.104 
 
Even if the acts are attached to the state, it does not mean the functional 
immunity is part of the law of State immunity.105 Similarities do however 
exist. Functional immunity also extends to governmental acts and 
commercial acts, unless they were performed in a private capacity. Acts are 
official in nature only when the act is exclusively attributable to the state. 
Since the act is regarded as performed by the state, functional immunity 
relates to substantive law and assures the State Official a substantive defence 
from criminal proceedings in another state. As a logical consequence, the 
immunity also applies when the term of the official functions of the 
representative is over.106 Functional immunity applies erga omnes.107 
2.4.2.2 Personal immunity 
Under customary international law, Heads of States enjoy full immunity from 
coercive acts and criminal proceedings by foreign courts for official and 
private acts. Personal immunity (immunity rationae personae) attaches to the 
particular office, not the state, and provides the Head of State with absolute 
inviolability from foreign criminal jurisdictions for any act performed.108 
Such immunity applies regardless whether in an official or private capacity or 
whether the person is on an official or private visit abroad. The immunity 
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applies to acts performed during or prior to the official’s term of office, as 
long as the person holds the specific office.109 Personal immunity is solely a 
procedural bar while in office and not a judgment of the lawfulness of the 
official’s conduct. Hence, former Head of States may later be subject for 
prosecution for international crimes before national courts.110 The ICJ in the 
Arrest Warrant case confirms the absolute personal immunity. National case 
law supports this rule as well.111 
 
Three key justifications provide the basis for the wide scope of immunity 
against foreign domestic criminal proceedings for serving Heads of State. 
First, personal immunity preserves the dignity of the state.112 Even though 
Heads of State may incur individual criminal liability, the Head of State 
position remains an important component of the modern international legal 
system.113 Secondly, as a practical consideration, personal immunity prevents 
disruptions to the internal structure and function of a state, which may occur 
if its leader is subjected to the criminal jurisdiction of another state. However, 
most importantly, personal immunity is necessary to enable senior State 
Officials to carry out key sovereign functions. As such, personal immunity is 
linked with the functional necessity theory and the principle of sovereign 
equality.114 These justifications facilitate peaceful cooperation and mutual 
respect between states. 
2.5 Analysis   
The development of both State immunity and Head of State immunity under 
customary international law renders uncertain and changing over time, which 
testifies to the unclear state of immunities in international law. Both state 
practice and academia provides for conflicting interpretations and opinions to 
what extent a Head of State should enjoy immunity before both national and 
international jurisdiction. The unclear conditions of Head of State immunity 
under customary international law should leave States uncertain of its 
obligation to respect such immunities. 
 
Already during the 19th century conflicting opinions of State immunity was 
provided in case law. Absolute immunity was stated in the Schooner 
Exchange, but courts in Italy and Belgium rejected the doctrine soon 
thereafter. Developments in society and the evolution of democratic trends 
and the rule of law attested that the absolute doctrine was applied by personal 
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sovereigns and granted immunity as a matter of courtesy rather than a matter 
of law. Although the restrictive immunity doctrine made a distinction 
between sovereign and non-sovereign acts, it only considered trade related 
acts as non-sovereign acts. The Head of State was still protected by State 
immunity as vested in the Head of State. 
 
It was not until the Nuremberg trials and the initiation of international 
criminal law Head of States were faced with individual criminal 
responsibility applied without relevance of capacity. As such, the relationship 
between the state and its Head of State drifted apart. Functional necessity 
became the prevailing rationale for Head of State and the immunity is now 
vested in the act performed, not in the individual preforming it. 
 
With the rise of the human rights movement and greater international support 
for ending impunity for perpetrators of international crimes, Head of State 
immunity seems to diminish. Although the normative hierarchy theory might 
be questioned on its merits, its development shows a greater support in 
international society for a weakening state of Head of State immunity in 
international law. The continuing change of practice of Head of State 
immunity also testifies to this conclusion. The fact that Head of State 
immunity is still a matter of customary international law and not yet codified, 
similar to other immunity rules, also testifies to the uncertainty of its scope.  
 
The principles of individual responsibility and irrelevance of official capacity 
are part of customary international law, proven by state practice in national 
jurisdiction and confirmed by international courts. However, the irrelevance 
of capacity seems to apply only to functional immunity before national 
courts. Personal Head of State immunity before national courts is 
undisputedly absolute. Moreover, although in a modified manner, the practice 
of personal immunity has the same aim as the absolute immunity doctrine 
had already had in the 19th century; to protect sovereign functions of a State 
and its official. However, the development of international criminal law, and 
motivation within the international society to end impunity, opened up for 
prosecution of incumbent Heads of States before international courts and 
tribunals where personal immunity may not apply. This will be discussed in 
following chapters of this thesis.  
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3 Personal Head of State 
immunity before international 
tribunals and courts 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter three will explain and analyse the development of the legal rationale 
for personal Head of State immunity before international courts and tribunals. 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine how personal immunity for Heads 
of States has been applied before other international courts and tribunals in 
order to later be analysed and compared with the ICC. 
 
Initially, the chapter will discuss the Arrest Warrant case issued by the ICJ 
because this was the first case to open up for the possibility of prosecution of 
incumbent Heads of States before international courts. Since the Nuremberg 
trials, other international courts and tribunals have been established. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL are of particular 
interest. The ICC is a treaty-based international court with a close 
relationship to the UN. Therefore, both the practice by the ICTY and ICTR, 
which are established pursuant to a UNSC Resolution under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, and SCSL, which is a treaty-based body established through 
the UN, is of interest. There are important differences in the authority of 
these tribunals and court regarding removal of personal Head of State 
immunity.  
 
The development of the legal rationale for personal Head of State immunity 
before international courts and tribunals includes conflicting interpretations 
and opinions, both with regards to court practice and academia, which will be 
discussed in each section. 
3.2 The ICJ - Arrest Warrant Case 
The ICJ is not an international criminal court, but the principal judicial organ 
of the UN.115 It was established in June 1945 by the UN Charter and began its 
work in April 1946. The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with 
international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory 
opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorised UN organs and 
specialised agencies.116 
 
In the Arrest Warrant case, issued by the ICJ in 2000, the ICJ had to decide 
whether Belgium had violated customary international law by issuing an 
arrest warrant for the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs of DRC, 
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi. The warrant included war crimes and crimes 
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against humanity. DRC filed an application with the ICJ complaining that 
Belgium, by issuing the arrest warrant, had violated the personal immunity of 
its Foreign Minister.117 Belgium argued that immunity from prosecution did 
not apply to proceedings involving charges of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.118 
 
In its judgment, the ICJ held that the immunity from national criminal 
jurisdiction of incumbent ministers of foreign affairs is absolute for all acts, 
both private and official.119 The ICJ could not deduce from state practice that 
an exception in the form of a customary rule had developed to remove 
personal immunity before national courts. As such, it concluded that a 
serving foreign minister should be granted immunity before national courts, 
even from accusations of serious international crimes.120 
 
In the international context, the Arrest Warrant case created possible 
exceptions to personal immunity. In a broadly worded statement of obiter 
dictum, the ICJ stated that although Heads of State enjoy absolute personal 
immunity before foreign domestic courts, former and incumbent Heads of 
State may be subject to criminal proceedings under four different 
circumstances, on of them being: ‘the accused may still be tried before an 
international criminal court’.121 
 
In this matter, the ICJ also cited the irrelevance of official capacity provisions 
contained in art. 7(2) of the Statute for the ICTY, art. 6(2) of the Statute of 
the ICTR and art. 27(2) of the Rome Statute, which hinder immunity as a 
procedural bar before the mentioned courts.122 
 
Consequently, although only obiter dictum, the statement made by the ICJ 
remains an important declaration from the principal judicial organ of the UN; 
that incumbent Heads of State may not have immunity before international 
criminal bodies.123 
 
The judgment, in combination with the development from the Nuremberg 
Trials with its formula, has opened up for scholars to argue a new rule has 
developed under customary international law. This rule removes personal 
immunity before international courts. Proponents for this new rule argue that 
with the increasing complexity of the international legal system and the 
greater variety of forms of state practice, the traditional two limb test creating 
a new customary rule, i.e. objective state practice and opinio juris, is 
insufficient.124 Instead a modern positivist approach looks beyond the 
configuration of international practice and analyses whether a proposition can 
be safely derived from general principles governing the broad legal evolution 
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or a set of related international norms.125 This argument includes international 
judicial decisions, and official state pronouncements.126  
 
However, the ICJ did not address what constitutes an international court or 
tribunal nor did it address on what basis personal immunities would not apply 
before competent international criminal courts and tribunals. Moreover, the 
ICJ did not specify the exact scope of the asserted non-application of 
personal immunities before international courts and tribunals. Neither did it 
distinguish between the power of an international court to issue an arrest 
warrant and the obligations of states to disregard the customary rules of 
international law on immunities in order to comply with a request for arrest 
and surrender issued by such court or tribunal.127  
3.3 Chapter VII of the UN Charter and UN 
member states obligations 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter sets out the UNSC’s powers to maintain 
peace. Pursuant to art. 39, it allows the Council to ‘determine the existence of 
any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’128, and to take 
military and non-military action to ‘restore international peace and 
security’.129 The Chapter provides the framework within which the UNSC 
may take enforcement action. Art. 41 of the UN Charter includes the power 
for the UNSC to create international tribunals or courts. 
 
Moreover, art. 25 of the UN Charter state: ‘The Members of the United 
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter’.130 Further, art. 103 provides that the 
obligations under the UN Charter prevail over other international obligations:  
 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.131 
 
Art. 103 is unique in international practice as it is the only true meaningful 
prospective conflict clause. Under its terms, a UN Charter obligation prevails 
over any conflicting obligation. That does not mean that the conflicting norm 
is invalidated, as with conflicts involving norms of jus cogens. The 
conflicting norm remains valid and continues to exist; the state is merely 
prohibited to apply it.132 In addition, it is not a simple rule of priority; it also 
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precludes or removes any wrongfulness due to the breach of the conflicting 
norm. In other words, a state cannot be held accountable for complying with 
its obligations under the Charter, even if in doing so it must violate another 
rule.133  
 
In addition, art. 103 does not merely state that the Charter itself will prevail 
over conflicting obligations, but that member states’ obligations under the 
Charter will also prevail. This formulation is broader, as it encompasses state 
obligations arising from binding decisions of UN organs, pursuant to art. 25 
of the UN Charter.134 The effect of art. 103 also extends to binding Security 
Council resolutions. This has been confirmed by both doctrine and 
practice,135 as well as by the ICJ in the Lockerbie case.136 
 
However, it has been debated whether or not art. 103 includes the Charter’s 
prevailing over customary international law. By its own terms, the Charter 
only prevails over ‘international agreement’, such as a treaty. Scholars have 
argued for this textual interpretation, and that the Charter does not prevail 
over customary international law.137 However, other scholars have argued 
that obligations under a customary rule frequently run in parallel with treaty 
obligations with the same substantive content. Therefore, it would run 
contrary to the object and purpose of art. 103 if it could only preclude a 
state’s responsibility for failing to abide by the treaty, and not by the identical 
customary rule.138 The latter has been confirmed by the practice of 
international courts and tribunals. 
 
A decision issued pursuant to art. 41 of the UN Charter, to establish an 
international court or tribunal is binding upon member states of the UN. If 
such decision includes an obligation for member states to cooperate with 
those courts or tribunals, member states are obligated to comply with any 
request for judicial assistance made by that court or tribunal. Hence, when a 
request for arrest of a person enjoying immunity, conflicting law providing 
such immunity shall not be applicable pursuant to art. 103 of the UN 
Charter.139 Moreover, in the Namibia Advisory Opinion140 the ICJ confirmed 
that whether a binding decision is made under art. 25 of the UN Charter is to 
be determined by looking not only at the language of the resolution, but the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding it.141 
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3.4 The ICTY and the ICTR 
Almost half a century after the Nuremberg trials, the concept of international 
criminal tribunals was again established by the UNSC. Grave violations of 
human rights triggered the establishment of the ICTY in 1993, and the ICTR 
in 1994. Both were established by the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. The aim was to restore international peace and security in the 
concerned regions.142 
 
The ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute resemble each other. However, while 
the war crime provisions reflect that the Rwandan genocide took place within 
the context of a purely internal armed conflict, the ICTY provisions reflect an 
international conflict.143 The ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of international humanitarian law as 
well as war crimes committed in the territory of the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) since January 1991.144 The ICTR has jurisdiction over the 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity or serious violations of the laws 
of war in the territory of Rwanda and over Rwandan citizens responsible for 
such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states between 1 
January and 31 December 1994.145 
 
Art. 7(2) of the ICTY Statute and art. 6(2) of the ICTR Statute are identical to 
the Nuremberg formula stating the principles of individual criminal 
responsibility and irrelevance of capacity. The articles provide for criminal 
responsibility and the removal of immunities normally vested in Heads of 
State under customary international law. 
 
In addition, UNSC Resolution 827 and 955, respectively established an 
obligation for member states of the UN to cooperate fully with the ICTY and 
ICTR. Both resolutions imply obligations of States to comply with requests 
for assistance or orders issued by the tribunals.146  
 
As art. 25 and art.103 of the UN Charter provide that all member states to the 
UN Charter, must accept the UNSC resolutions and such resolutions prevail 
over other sources of international law, including the customary rules of 
Head of State immunity. Consequently, such immunity does not apply before 
the ICTY and the ICTR, including with concerns of judicial assistance, such 
as request for arrest.147 
 
The provisions under the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR stating the 
individual criminal responsibility and irrelevance of capacity have not been 
applied in many cases. In addition, where it has been applied, functional, not 
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personal, immunity has been of focus. However, the importance of the 
provisions is significant for the development of Head of State immunity. 
 
The case Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic148 before ICTY may, however, be 
addressed. It was the first case in which the question of Head of State 
immunity was addressed before an international tribunal. Milosevic had been 
arrested 1 April 2001 in Belgrade by local authorities and was transferred to 
the ICTY in The Hague on 29 June 2001. Originally, he was indicted for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Indictment of genocide was later 
added.149 
 
The first indictment was made while Milosevic was still the incumbent Head 
of State of FRY.150 However, when the trial began, he was no longer in 
office. Therefore, the issue of whether Milosevic as serving Head of State 
was entitled to personal immunity was never raised. Instead, Milosevic 
argued the ICTY lacked jurisdiction because he was the former Head of State 
and entitled to functional immunity. In response, the Trial Chamber of the 
ICTY stated:  
 
There is absolutely no basis for challenging the validity of article 7, 
paragraph 2, which at this time reflects a rule of customary 
international law. The history of this rule can be traced to the 
development of the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility after 
the Second World War, when it was incorporated in article 7 of the 
Nuremberg Charter and article 6 of the Tokyo Tribunal Charter. The 
customary character of the rule is further supported by its 
incorporation in a wide number of other instruments, as well as case 
law.151 
 
Before the trial was completed, Milosevic passed away of a heart attack on 
11 March 2006. However, the case is still regarded as decisive precedent on 
the irrelevance of official capacity and non-applicability of Head of State 
immunity before international tribunals as established by the UNSC under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.152 
 
Even though Milosevic was the incumbent Head of State of former 
Yugoslavia at the time of his indictment and the issuance of arrest warrant, 
no one has questioned this in accordance with personal immunities of Head 
of States under customary international law.153 
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3.5 The SCSL 
In 2002, the SCSL was established.154 The government of Sierra Leone had 
requested the UN to establish an international court to prosecute those 
responsible for the serious violations of international humanitarian law 
during the Sierra Leone civil war between 1991 and 2002.155  
 
Similar to the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes, art. 6 of the SCSL Statute 
includes the Nuremberg formula.156 In contrast to the ICTY and the ICTR, 
the authority of the SCSL is not enhanced through a resolution in accordance 
with the UN Charter Chapter VII.157 The court is ‘a treaty-based sui generis 
court of mixed jurisdictions and composition’.158 The court is established on 
the legal basis of the Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for 
Sierra Leone.159 Therefore, there is no established obligation for UN member 
states to comply with any requests by the SCSL.160 However, the court in the 
case Prosecutor v. Taylor161 addressed the issue of arrest warrants and 
immunities. 
 
Taylor was the incumbent Head of State of Liberia when the SCSL issued his 
arrest warrant in March 2003. In August the same year, he resigned from his 
office and he was arrested and transferred to the SCSL in November 2006.162 
 
In May 2003, arguing he was entitled to personal Head of State immunity 
from the jurisdiction of the SCSL, Taylor filed an application objecting to the 
indictment and the arrest warrant. He argued that the indictment was invalid 
since the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case established that incumbent Heads of 
States enjoy absolute immunity and that the SCSL did not have such Chapter 
VII authority which could allow exceptions to such immunities.163 
 
Taylor’s application was referred to the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL, 
which concluded that the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a Head 
of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal or 
court. The Chamber stated: ‘There is no reason to conclude that it should be 
treated as anything other than an international tribunal or court, with all that 
implies for the question of immunity for a serving Head of State'.164 
 
The SCSL denied Taylor immunity and stated there is no support in state 
practice that international law grants immunities in relation to international 
                                                
154 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000),14 August 2000. 
155 SCSL Statute, art. 1(1). 
156 SCSL Statute, art. 6. 
157Alebeek, Immunity (n. 34) 285. 
158 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
4 October 2000, UNDoc.S/2000/915. 
159 Agreement Between The United Nations and The Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 12 April 2002. 
160 See UN res. 1315 (n. 154); SCSL Statute. 
161 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Special Court of Sierra Leone, 26 April 2012. 
162 Alebeek, Immunity (n. 34) 285. 
163 Prosecutor v. Taylor (n. 161) para 6, 51. 
164 Prosecutor v. Taylor (n. 161) para 41. 
 36 
courts. It found that the jurisdiction of the SCSL is similar to that of the 
ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC, also with regards to personal immunity of a 
Head of State.165 SCSL endorsed the view that the ‘international nature’ of 
the SCSL denied immunity to an incumbent Head of State indicted for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.166 
 
The SCSL also stressed that underlying rationales for an international court 
entails that immunity does not apply before it. The Appeals Chamber of the 
SCSL declared, although not immediately evident, the ICJ distinguishes 
between the application of immunity between national and international 
courts because concerns of sovereign equality are irrelevant before 
international criminal tribunals.167 International courts derive their mandate 
from the international community, which safeguards against unilateral 
judgment by one state.168 
 
Some scholars have heavily criticised the decision of the SCSL. David Koller 
argued that a general exception based on the court’s ‘international nature’ 
breaches the fundamental pacta tertiis rule codified in art. 34 of the Vienna 
Convention.169 He believes that the reasoning by the SCSL fails to explain 
how the fairness of the tribunal can disregard important immunity principles 
of international law.170 Rosanna van Alebeek also doubts whether the 
‘international mandate’ can remove established immunity rules under 
international law.171 
 
On the other hand, Claus Kreß and Kimberly Prost argue that international 
courts should be viewed more purposefully as having the jus puniendi of the 
international community.172 As such, they argue any collective judgment 
rendered represents the will of the international community. This ‘collective 
nature’ enables treaty-based courts to prosecute all persons, including a 
serving Head of State of a third state. Their argument is based on policy 
considerations. International courts have been established as additional 
mechanisms for combating impunity. Therefore, in their opinion, rules, 
which are obstacle to fulfilling this objective, should be excluded. 173 
3.6 Analysis  
Many years past by before the next international criminal tribunal was 
established after the Nuremberg Tribunal. One can argue this is because it 
was not necessary. However, since grave human rights violations were 
committed in various regions during these fifty years, it rather confirms the 
sensitive issues arising in the establishment of such tribunals or courts. The 
recent development of personal Head of State immunity before international 
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criminal courts and tribunals indicates an open approach to prosecute 
incumbent Heads of States. The principles of individual criminal 
responsibility and irrelevance of official capacity are part of customary law, 
however, these principles do not seem to include personal Head of State 
immunity. Conflicting interpretation and opinions by both practice and 
academia render the scope of personal immunity before international courts 
uncertain and dependent on the legal regime applied. 
 
The Arrest Warrant case confirms that incumbent Heads of States enjoys 
absolute personal immunity when facing domestic charges of international 
crimes. Head of State immunity from arrest and prosecution in the territory of 
foreign states appears undisputed. Nevertheless, the ICJ opened up for 
possible prosecution of incumbent Heads of States before international 
criminal courts. Although dissenting legal rationales was issued, it seems 
feasible that an international criminal court have jurisdiction to prosecute and 
request arrest of an incumbent Head of State. This is also confirmed by the 
practice of ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. However, the question is on what legal 
basis. 
 
The arguments of a development of a new customary rule removing personal 
immunity before international courts, are persuasive, as they recognise 
different moral and policy considerations as well as key developments in 
international criminal law. Such argument may best express the evolving 
attitudes of states toward creating a ‘culture of accountability’ in the 
international system. However, the formation of a customary rule that binds 
all states is complex. Elements of state practice and other evidence to support 
this argument are highly contested. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact creation 
of such rule, thus making this argument controversial. 
 
In its judgment, the ICJ left a few important question marks to the matter. 
Specifically, it did not define an ‘international court’, nor did it take into 
account the differences between the establishment of each international 
criminal court or tribunal.  
 
Rules of customary international law on personal immunities aim at 
preventing states from interfering with the fulfilment of foreign states’ 
sovereign activities in their territories and from abusing their authority by 
unduly submitting foreign state’s Head of States to their criminal and civil 
jurisdiction. Consequently, it can be argued the very rationale of the rules on 
personal immunities become inapplicable when criminal jurisdiction is 
exercised by an international criminal court established by the international 
society.  
 
The ICTY and ICTR were created by virtue of a decision by the UNSC. As 
such, they are vested with the authority of a Chapter VII measure. The 
obligation for UN member states to cooperate with the tribunals is laid down 
in a binding resolution of the UNSC. Therefore, any order or request for 
judicial assistance emanating from the two tribunals has the authority of a 
decision of the UNSC. Thus, member states must comply, even if the 
decision is conflicting with other obligations under international law, 
pursuant to art. 25 and 103 of the UN Charter. In addition, the Statutes of the 
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tribunals establish the principles of individual criminal responsibility and 
irrelevance of capacity. As such, a UN member state would not violate 
customary international law by arresting an incumbent Head of State of 
another UN member state pursuant to an order issued by any of these 
tribunals. The Milosevic judgment, as well as the absence of following 
debate, confirms this conclusion. This judgment also confirms the principles 
of individual criminal responsibility and irrelevance of capacity as part of 
customary international law. 
 
However, it is not clear if this would be the case for a request to arrest a Head 
of State of a non-member state of the UN. Gaeta is of the opinion this would 
entail a breach of that non-member states immunity rights under customary 
international law.174 However, not much else is written about this, probably 
because most of the world’s States are members of the UN. 
 
The SCSL is a treaty-based court, therefore, the situation is more complex 
regarding its jurisdiction and authority to order States to comply with arrest 
warrants with respect to personal immunity of Heads of States. The court 
does not have the authority of a UNSC decisions pursuant to the UN Charter. 
The court denied Taylor personal immunity even though he was the 
incumbent Head of State during his indictment. It did this because of the 
‘international nature’ of the court. It is apparent that the SCSL is an 
international court since it was established through the UN and is not part of 
Sierra Leone’s domestic judicial system. However, it may be held that SCSL 
does not have jurisdiction over Heads of States of a third state, and that States 
are not obligated to comply with any orders issued by the SCSL in this 
matter. The necessary connection between the UNSC and the SCSL is 
missing, thus, art. 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, which is required to remove 
customary rules of personal Head of State immunity, is not applicable. The 
conflicting interpretations and opinions following the Taylor judgment imply 
uncertainty of the authority of the SCSL. The court also failed to analyse 
whether a treaty-based body may remove the personal immunity of an 
incumbent Head of State of a third state. 
 
The ICC is a treaty-based court, but has a close connection to the UN system. 
Therefore, there are similarities to ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. Personal Head of 
State immunity before the ICC will be reviewed and analysed in the 
following chapters. 
                                                
174 Gaeta, ‘Immunity from Arrest’ (n. 22) 327. 
 39 
4 Personal Head of State 
immunity and State Party 
obligations under the Rome 
Statute  
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter four will review and discuss State Party obligations under the Rome 
Statute, specifically its obligation to arrest and surrender persons sought by 
the ICC. This entails to discuss the scope of the articles addressing personal 
Head of State immunity, the effect of a UNSC referral of a situation to the 
jurisdiction of the Court, as well as the non-cooperation mechanism of the 
Court. The role of the UNSC and the ASP will also be discussed for the 
purpose to argue for solutions to give effect to an appropriate legal rationale. 
 
In order to give a background and provide for teleological interpretation, the 
first section will address the complicated history of the establishment of the 
ICC. Moreover, understanding the functions of the Court is essential to 
understand the issues of state obligations and Head of State immunity. 
Therefore, other aspects of the ICC will be briefly explained. This includes 
reviewing the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, the scope of its 
jurisdiction and the principle of complementarity. 
4.2 Drafting of the Rome Statute 
Already during the 1920s several attempts were made to establish a 
permanent international criminal court. In 1926, The International 
Association of Penal Law (AIDP) and the International Law Association 
(ILA) jointly created a draft statute on the establishment on such court. It was 
presented to several European parliaments and the League of Nations. 
Because of the political differences and the following Second World War, 
there was no conclusive result.175 
 
In the late 1940’s, after the World War II and the establishment of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, the project of establishing an international criminal 
court was introduced for the first time before the UNGA. In 1948, the UNGA 
assigned the project to the International Law Commission (ILC), which at its 
first session before the UNGA in 1949 concluded that the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court was both desirable and possible.176 
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However, the UNGA was not very impressed by the work of the ILC. 
Consequently, the UNGA decided to assign the preparation of the draft 
statute to another committee, established by the UNGA itself. The work was 
suspended in 1954 because difficulties on agreeing upon a definition of 
aggression. However, when the definition of aggression was adopted in 1974, 
the project of the court was again postponed.177 
 
Not until 40 years later, in the 1990s, the UNGA once again invited the ILC 
to examine the matter. The establishment of ICTY and the ICTR reminded 
the international community of the need for a permanent international 
criminal court.178 In 1993, the UNGA finally decided to give priority to the 
preparation of a draft statute for an international criminal court. The ILC 
completed its work and presented it to the UNGA in 1994 with the 
recommendation that a conference of plenipotentiaries be convened in order 
to conclude a statute on the establishment of an international criminal 
court.179  
 
After receiving the ILC Draft Statute, member states of the UN wished to 
have an opportunity to examine the draft. An ad hoc Committee was 
established by the UNGA.180 During 1995, the committee meet to review the 
issues arising from the draft statute prepared by the ILC. In December the 
same year, a Preparatory Committee was created to continue the preparation 
of a ‘widely acceptable consolidated’ text of a statute.181 With the ILC Draft 
Statute as a basis, it took the approximately 500 additional proposals and 
amendments submitted by States into account and completed a statute, which 
was eventually finalised and adopted during the Rome Conference in Rome, 
Italy, on 17 July 1998.182 A vast majority of African States voted in favour.183  
 
Like other regions, Africa showed a very positive support towards the 
creation of the ICC and contributed to the outcome of negotiations. During 
the negotiations, African states stressed a special interest in the establishment 
of the ICC. Its people had for centuries endured human rights atrocities such 
as slavery, colonial wars and other horrific acts of war and violence, which 
continue to exist despite the continent’s post-colonial phase.184  
 
The Rome Statute was, and still is, by no means considered to be perfect. It is 
a product of multilateral negotiations amongst 160 States with different 
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values, interests and concerns.185 As a result of establishing a generally 
acceptable instrument, no state or group of state could claim victory or 
monopoly of the Statute. However, it was the best instrument possible with 
present circumstances, hence, it enjoyed wide support. Eighty States signed 
the Statute during the following six months of its adoption. Senegal became 
the first state in the world to ratify the Rome Statute on 2 February 1999.186 
In 2002, the Rome Statute obtained its requisite sixty ratifications for its 
entry into force. One year later, the world’s first independent and permanent 
international criminal court was fully operational.187 
 
Today, the Statute has 123 State Parties, 33 are African States, which 
comprises the largest regional bloc in the ASP. 188 However, because of both 
political and legal difficulties during the drafting of the Statute, some of the 
world’s most vigorous states, also permanent members of the UNSC, such as 
the U.S.,189 China and Russia,190 have not ratified the Rome Statute.191 
 
The U.S. position to the ICC has affected the relationship between African 
States and the ICC. In addition to not ratify the Rome Statute, it has 
concluded bilateral immunity agreements to avoid referrals to the ICC. In 
Africa alone, 42 States, 26 of them parties to the Rome Statute, has signed 
such agreements.192 While precluding cooperation with the ICC, the U.S., 
together with other members of the UNSC, has referred situations involving 
African States to the ICC. Consequently, the AU claimed that former 
colonialists are using the ICC to discipline weaker and poor developing 
countries in impoverished continents as Africa.193 
4.3 ICC and the UN 
The ICC is an independent international organisation. Nevertheless, the UN 
played a crucial role in the creation of the Court and funded its 
establishment.194 The Preamble of the Rome Statute refers to ‘an independent 
permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United 
Nations System’. The Negotiated Relationship Agreement195, adopted in 
                                                
185 Lee Roy S. (ed.), The International Criminal Court: the making of the Rome Statute: 
issues, negotiations, results, Kluwer Law International, (The Hague, 1999) 5-6. 
186 UN, Senegal first state to ratify Rome Statute of International Court, Press Release, 
L/2905, available at <https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990203.l2905.html> accessed 
2018-05-16. 
187 Schabas, Commentary (n. 78) 25, 27.  
188 See ASP, The State Parties to the Rome Statute, < https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rom
e%20statute.aspx> accessed 2018-05-16. 
189 The U.S. is signatory, but has not ratified the Rome Statue. 
190 Russia is signatory, but has not ratified the Rome Statute.  
191 See Lee (n. 185) 582-586, 616-618, 632-634 for views and comments of the Rome Statute 
made by the mentioned states during the Rome Conference. 
192 Alexis Arieff and others ‘International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy 
Issues’, (2010) Congressional Research Service, 4-5. 
193 Chacha Murungu, Japhet Biegon, (red.), Prosecuting international crimes in Africa, 
(Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria, 2011) 158. 
194 Schabas, Commentary (n. 78) 67. 
195 UN General Assembly, Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
International Criminal Court, 20 August 2004, (Negotiated Relationship Agreement). 
 42 
accordance with art. 2 of the Rome Statute, defines the formal legal 
relationship between the ICC and the UN. Art. 2 states: 
 
The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations 
through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties 
to this Statute and thereafter concluded by the President of the Court 
on its behalf.196 
 
The Rome Statute includes specific provisions providing the UNSC with the 
authority to refer situations to the Court, as well as blocking prosecutions 
under certain circumstances.197 
 
The Negotiated Relationship Agreement address issues such as the exchange 
of information, judicial assistance, and cooperation. Provision of the 
Agreement provide for the exchange of representatives, including the 
participation of the Court as an observer at sessions of the UNGA, to which 
the Court submits an annual report.198 The Agreement defines mechanisms of 
cooperation where the UNSC refers a situation to the Court in accordance 
with art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute.199 Specifically, art. 17(3) of the 
Agreement states:  
 
Where a matter has been referred to the Court by the Security Council 
and the Court makes a finding, pursuant to article 87, paragraph 5 (b) 
or paragraph 7, of the Statute, of a failure by a State to cooperate with 
the Court, the Court shall inform the Security Council or refer the 
matter to it […]200 
 
However, there are no specified actions required by the UNSC when such 
referral of a non-cooperation decision is made. In addition, the agreement 
does not address the issue of immunities, other than for persons enjoying 
immunity due to her or his work in the UN.201 
4.4 Jurisdiction 
4.4.1 Crimes and preconditions 
The articles in the Rome Statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court 
caused a great deal of debate during the entire preparatory process of the 
Rome Statute. The debate concerned that the articles address the fundamental 
issue of what restrictions should be imposed on the sovereignty of the State 
Parties, as well as the function of the UNSC.202 
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Art. 5 of the Rome Statute is the general provision stating the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Court. The jurisdiction is limited to ‘the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’.203 Specifically, 
art. 5 states: ‘The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with 
respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes 
against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.’204 
 
Although art. 5 of the Rome Statute is considered as the core of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction over all crimes within the subject matter is 
compulsory. Besides falling within the subject-matter jurisdiction, any 
situation or case to be investigated and prosecuted must also meet temporal, 
territorial, and personal jurisdictional requirements.205 
 
The ICC cannot exercise universal jurisdiction, which was the original 
purpose stated by a clear majority of States during the drafting of the Rome 
Statute.206 Instead, the situations in which the Court has jurisdiction are 
limited. Art. 11 of the Rome Statute provides that the Court has jurisdiction 
with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute, i.e. 
after 1 July 2002. If a state ratifies the Rome Statute after 1 July 2002, the 
Court has jurisdiction from the day of ratification, unless the state accepts 
jurisdiction for the period before it became a contracting party. Art. 12(1) 
provides that a State, which becomes a party to the Statute, thereby accepts 
the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in art. 5. 
 
Two established principles determine when the ICC has jurisdiction. Firstly, 
Art. 12(2)(a) states that the Court may exercise jurisdiction if the crime took 
place in the territory of a State Party or in the territory of a non-party state 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. The principle of territorial jurisdiction 
is universally accepted in international criminal law and established in many 
treaties and conventions.207 If a crime is committed in a member state by a 
national of a non-party state, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction, i.e. the 
nationality of the offender is irrelevant.208 
 
Secondly, art. 12(2)(b) provides that the Court may exercise jurisdiction if the 
accused of the crime is a national of a State Party or a national of a state not 
party to the Rome Statute, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. The 
principle of active personality jurisdiction is well established in domestic law 
among a majority of States. In the context of international criminal law, the 
principle is universally accepted by state practice, thus, opinio juris, a rule of 
customary international law.209 In case a national of a member state commits 
a crime in a non-party state, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction, i.e. the 
Court has in this sense extra-territorial jurisdiction.210 
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Art. 12(3) declares that a non-party may accept the jurisdiction of the Court 
on ad hoc basis without becoming a party to the Rome Statute. The 
prerequisite is that the crime was committed in that state’s territory or by one 
of its nationals.211 Several African states, including Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda, 
DRC, Central African Republic and Mali, have accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Court and referred their respective situations to the ICC.212 This 
possibility was not very controversial during the drafting of the Rome 
Statute, but has since then been criticised, particularly by the U.S.213 
Concerns has been raised that a non-party could pick a particular incident 
over which it would grant the ICC jurisdiction, but that the actions of the 
non-party itself is outside the jurisdiction of the Court.214 According to 
critical states, such rule could easily be abused. The interpretation of this rule 
is to some extent still debated. However, the prevailing opinion seems to be 
that acceptance of the Courts jurisdiction is made regarding a situation, not a 
particular crime.215 Thus, all actors in such situation may be subject to 
prosecution before the ICC. 
4.4.2 Exercise of jurisdiction 
Once it is established that the ICC has jurisdiction over a situation as 
described in the previous chapter, the jurisdiction must be triggered by one of 
the three mechanisms stated in Art. 13 of the Rome Statute. The first 
mechanism is that a State Party refers the situation to the Prosecutor. Only 
State Parties can trigger the jurisdiction, hence, no ad hoc referrals by non-
party states can be issued, unless the situation concerns citizens or the 
territory of that state. However, any State Party may trigger the jurisdiction, 
although it is not involved in the situation.216 
 
The second mechanism provided for in art. 13(c) is the Prosecutor initiating 
an investigation propio mutu. This is essential for the sake of effectiveness 
and independence of the Court.217 
 
The third mechanism provided for in art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute is the 
UNSC referral. By acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC 
can trigger the jurisdiction by referring a situation to the Prosecutor. In 
contradiction to the previously explained triggering mechanisms, there are no 
further requirements. Once the UNSC has determined that a crime listed in 
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art. 5 has been allegedly committed, it may refer that situation to the 
Prosecutor. Art. 13(b) requires the UNSC to act under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.218  
 
In addition, art. 12(2) of the Rome Statute does not address conferral of 
jurisdiction by the UNSC, hence, the conditions stated in the article must not 
be met. However, this is not stated explicitly in the Rome Statute. It does 
suggest that any situation including a crime listed in art. 5, in theory could be 
referred to the Court by the UNSC, irrespective of where or by whom it was 
committed. The crime must however have been committed after the Statue’s 
entry into force. 219  
 
During negotiations of the Rome Statute, a minority of states strongly 
opposed including a provision that would allow the UNSC to refer situations 
or cases for the ICC to investigate. These states feared that a referral from the 
politically-oriented UNSC would undermine the legitimacy and 
independence of the ICC. However, the majority of states agreed that a 
provision was necessary and reached a compromise in art. 13(b).220 
 
For these reasons, some commentators have referred to the ICC as an ’ad hoc 
permanent international criminal tribunal’. With this view, the ICC draws 
upon the experiences of the ICTY and ICTR established by the UNSC under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but negates the need to establish further 
tribunals, providing for a less costly and time-consuming option.221 However, 
the ICC is treaty-based, limiting the UNSC ability to influence the practice of 
the ICC.222 
 
If the UNSC triggers the Court’s jurisdiction, the UNSC must live within the 
parameters of the Rome Statute with respect to such matters as jurisdiction.223 
However, other than with regards to jurisdiction, the legal effect of an UNSC 
resolution referring a situation in a non-party to the ICC is heavily discussed 
and is one of the main issues concerning immunities and the Court’s request 
to arrest. As the Bashir case and the legal effect of Resolution 1593 are 
central to this discussion, this will be illustrated below under chapter five.  
 
In addition, the principle of complementarity governs the exercise of the 
Court’s jurisdiction. This principle distinguishes the Court in several 
significant ways from other known institutions, including the ICTY and the 
ICTR. The Statute recognises that States have the first responsibility and 
right to prosecute international crimes. However, the ICC may only exercise 
jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to do so, including where they 
purport to act but in reality, are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out 
proceedings. The principle is a result of a fundamental issue regarding the 
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sovereignty of State Parties during the drafting of the Rome Statute: the 
relationship between the ICC and domestic courts.224 
 
To the effect of the principle of complementarity, enabling States to abide to 
the obligation of accountability for the crimes under the Court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction, the existence of national legislation, incorporating the 
crimes and general principles in the Rome Statute is essential.225 Regarding 
the enactment of national legislation, many State Parties have passed 
legislation implementing just some aspects of the Rome Statute, while 
several African states has enacted comprehensive implementing 
legislation.226 
4.5 Personal Head of State immunity 
Art. 27 of the Rome Statute provides the irrelevance of official capacity when 
being charged of a crime before the ICC:  
 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of 
State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an 
elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt 
a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in 
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.  
 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international 
law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person.227 
 
The wording of art. 27 is similar to the wordings of the Nuremberg Charter 
and the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. The introduction to the 
second paragraph of art. 27 however carries out a different function 
compared to the first paragraph. The first paragraph, which removes 
functional immunity, is derived from the Nuremberg Charter and is similar to 
the articles stating irrelevance of official capacity in the Statutes of the ICTY 
and the ICTR. It was never an issue of much debate during the drafting of the 
Rome Statute as it was already well established in previous generations of 
international courts and tribunals, as well as under customary international 
law.228 
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Art. 27(2) had no precedent in international criminal law before it was 
included in the Rome Statute. It addresses the personal immunity of a serving 
State Official, who is protected by immunity under customary international 
law, and provides for a renunciation of Head of State immunity by the State 
Parties to the Rome Statute. 229 In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ 
specifically mentioned ICC as an example in stating possible prosecution of 
incumbent Heads of States.230 State parties, by their ratification of the Rome 
Statute, have accepted the irrelevance of official capacity stated in art. 27 and 
renounced their right to plea personal immunity in respect of crimes within 
the subject-jurisdiction of the ICC stated in art. 5.231 However, the scope of 
this article when Heads of States of non-party states are subjected to 
jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to a UNSC referral is uncertain. 
4.6 State Party obligations 
4.6.1 General obligation to cooperate 
State cooperation is where the ICC is at its most vulnerable. As it has no own 
enforcement measures, the Court must depend almost entirely on national 
authorities to provide it with both defendants and evidence.232 The principle 
of complementarity is relevant in cooperation as well. The principle is based 
both on respect for the primary jurisdiction of States and on considerations of 
efficiency and effectiveness, since States will generally have the best access 
to evidence and witnesses and the resources to carry out proceedings.233 In 
addition, a State Party may not invoke its domestic law as basis for refusing 
to cooperate with the ICC. This principle is stated in art. 27 of the Vienna 
Convention.234 
 
Art. 86 of the Rome Statute provides: ‘States Parties shall, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court’.235  
 
As such, State Parties to the Rome Statute are under a general obligation to 
fully cooperate with the ICC in its investigations of crimes. This article 
introduces Part IX of the Statute, containing complex provisions reflecting 
the sensitivity of States measures that might encroach upon their own 
sovereignty.236 The obligations under Part IX solely apply to State Parties. 
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Obligations for non-state parties to the Rome Statute must be found 
elsewhere, e.g. in bilateral agreements or UNSC resolutions.237  
 
Concerning sovereignty, obligations under Part IX were a fundamental issue 
under debate during the drafting of the Rome Statute. The now familiar 
debate about whether the cooperation would be horizontal, i.e. analogous to 
extradition and mutual legal assistance, or vertical, by which there is an 
essentially sui generis relationship between the State Party and the ICC was 
addressed.238 As will be explained below under chapter five, the PTC has 
concluded cooperation is applicable on both a horizontal and vertical basis.  
4.6.2 Arrest and surrender  
Accused persons may appear before the ICC voluntarily or by law 
enforcement. Voluntary appearance is the consequence of a summons to 
appear, whereas appearance that is compelled is by an arrest warrant issued 
pursuant to art. 58. Arrest and surrender of persons wanted by the ICC 
remains a crucial issue. The Court cannot fulfil its mandate without it, as 
there can be no trials in abstentia.239 
 
Art. 89(1) proclaims a general obligation for State Parties to comply with a 
request for arrest and surrender by the Court. When the ICC transmits a 
request for arrest and surrender, the requested State must comply. During the 
drafting of the Rome Statue, competing concerns were raised. Some States 
insisted on a procedure to be developed within the Statute applicable to all 
States, while others argued that their own domestic procedures should be 
respected.240 Consequently, the result is a compromised formulation in art. 
89(1), stating that the arrest and surrender must be made in accordance with 
the provisions of Part IX of the Statute and the procedure under States’ 
national law, thus an expression of the principle of complementarity. Art. 
89(2) provides that if a case is admissible, the requested State shall proceed 
with the execution of the request to arrest. 
 
The ICC has issued thirty-three arrest warrants, twelve of which have been 
executed and the suspect taken into custody. Three persons have surrendered 
voluntarily to the Court after a warrant was issued. In four cases, the accused 
was deceased, including Gadhafi, the only other case, except the Bashir case, 
involving an arrest of a Head of State of a non-party State. In one case, the 
proceedings were halted following a successful challenge by the State to 
admissibility. Thirteen arrest warrants remain outstanding and the accused 
persons are at large, at least with respect to the Court. However, two of them 
are in the custody of national authorities.241 
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4.6.3 Cooperation with respect to immunity 
Art. 98 provides for exceptions to the obligations under art. 86-102. Art. 
98(1) covers international obligations in relations to immunities stating: 
 
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the State or 
diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the 
Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver 
of the immunity.242 
 
As explained above, under customary international law, states have the 
obligation to respect immunities of Heads of States. Art. 98(1) declares that 
the ICC cannot request a State Party to cooperate if such cooperation would 
violate the obligation to respect personal immunity of a State Official of a 
state not party to the Statute.243 If the ICC concludes that a request is in 
conflict with immunities belonging to an official of a non-party, it may 
inquire the concerned state of a waiver. Thus, art. 98(1) addresses the conflict 
of sources of law, i.e. immunity rules under customary international law and 
the Rome Statute.244 
 
There is a clear tension between art. 27 and 98. The two provisions were 
drafted by different committees in the preparation of the Rome Statute and no 
thought appears to have been given to their consistency with one another.245 
One way of reconciling the tension between the two provisions is to take the 
position that art. 27 removes immunity with respect to the Court and applies 
only to actions by the Court, but that art. 98 preserves those same immunities 
with respect to action to be taken by national authorities, which Gaeta 
argued.246 However, because the principle of complementarity is applicable 
with regards to cooperation, the better view should be that art. 27(2) removes 
personal immunity also with respect to action taken by national authorities.247 
 
Akande argued that a proclamation that immunities shall not bar the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the Court while leaving such immunities intact with respect 
to arrests by national authorities would mean that the Court would hardly be 
in a position to apply art. 27 and exercise its jurisdiction. ICC would not gain 
custody of persons entitled to immunity except where such persons are 
surrendered by their state or voluntarily. This would confine art. 27 to the 
rare case where a person entitled to immunity surrendered voluntarily. The 
effect of the argument would be to make an important provision directed at 
combating impunity inoperable for most practical purposes. To read the 
treaty in this way would be contrary to the principle of effectiveness in treaty 
interpretation. According to this principle, a treaty interpreter must read all 
applicable provisions of a treaty in a way, which gives meaning to all of them 
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harmoniously and is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing 
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.248  
In addition, neither art. 27 nor 98 address immunity in situations referred to 
the ICC by the UNSC. The relationship between art. 27(2) and 98(1) will be 
further discussed below under chapter five with regards to the Bashir case 
and decisions on non-cooperation. 
4.6.4 Request for cooperation 
Following the general obligation to cooperate, the very substantial text on 
‘request for cooperation: general provisions’ declares the core issues 
engaged in the state cooperation regime of the Rome Statute. Art. 87 affirms 
the authority of the Court to make requests of states, and proposes a 
mechanism for non-cooperation. The article deals with the modalities of such 
request of states, and contemplates application to non-party states as well as 
States Parties to the Rome Statute.249 
 
Art. 87(1) states the Court’s authority to make requests to States Parties for 
measures of cooperation. It establishes a general principle by which requests 
for cooperation from the ICC shall be transmitted through the ‘diplomatic 
channel’, i.e. the ASP.250 
 
Concerning non-parties, art. 87(5) provides that such states may be required 
to cooperate with the Court by virtue of a UNSC resolution issued pursuant 
to art. 13(b). However, the article as such cannot impose obligations upon a 
non-party state, hence, the Court can merely ‘invite’ such states to 
cooperate.251 
 
Under art. 87(7), if a State Party fails to comply with a request for 
cooperation, and thereby preventing the ICC from exercising its functions 
and powers under the Rome Statute, the Court may make a finding to that 
effect. The article amounts to a judicial finding that a state has breached its 
international obligations under the Rome Statute. If there is a finding of non-
cooperation, the Court may refer the matter to the ASP for its 
consideration.252  
 
Concerning situations referred by the UNSC, the ICC is to refer the matter to 
the UNSC, according to art. 17(3) of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement. 
Hence, non-party states, which are subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction pursuant 
to a UNSC resolution, can be subject for a decision of non-cooperation by the 
Court. Such decisions have been issued in both situations referred by the 
UNSC.253 
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Most decisions issued by the PTC regarding non-cooperation concern 
obligations to cooperate with regards to executing arrest warrants, e.g. raising 
challenges to the legal basis of a request for cooperation.  
 
In the context of non-party states, a decision was issued by the PTC regarding 
non-cooperation in the case Prosecutor v. Abdullah Al-Senussi.254 The Court 
had issued an arrest warrant against Al-Senussi for his alleged criminal 
responsibility for crimes against humanity committed in Benghazi, Libya, as 
Head of Military Intelligence of the Libyan Armed Forces.255 The PTC issued 
a decision pursuant a request by the Defence of Al-Senussi, to make a finding 
of non-cooperation against Mauritania.256  
 
In this case, the PTC concluded that obligations under the Rome Statute to 
cooperate fully with the Court are solely obligations of State Parties. Art. 
87(5)(a) provides that the Court may ‘invite’ any state not party to the Statute 
to provide assistance on the basis of an ad hoc agreement. Mauritania was not 
a State Party to the Statute and no ad hoc agreements had been arranged 
between the Court and Mauritania, thus, it had no obligations vis-à-vis the 
Court.257 In addition, the PTC stressed that the UNSC in its Resolution 1970 
clarified that ‘States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under 
the Statute’.258 
 
Generally, State Parties are willing to cooperate regarding arrest warrants. 
For example, in the case Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag 
Mohamed Ag Mahmoud (Al Hassan), the defendant, alleged chief of the 
Islamic Police, suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes in 
Timbuktu, Mali, was handed over to the ICC by the authorities of Mali.259  
 
Also in the case Prosecutor v. Gbagbo260, in which the PTC issued an arrest 
warrant against the incumbent President of Côte d'Ivoire. Although Côte 
d'Ivoire is a party to the Rome Statute today, it was not at the time of the 
arrest warrant.261 However, Côte d'Ivoire had accepted the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.262 Such acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction made art. 27(2) 
applicable, thereby revoking the immunity of Gbagbo under customary 
international law.263 Gbagbo was transferred to the custody of ICC by the 
authorities of Côte d'Ivoire.264  
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Both State Parties and non-parties to the Rome Statute, namely, Central 
African Republic, Uganda, the U.S., Belgium and the Netherlands also 
cooperated with the ICC in arresting and transferring Dominic Ongwen, 
charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in 
Uganda, to the custody of ICC.265 
  
Without doubt, the most pressing issue regarding non-cooperation due to 
request to arrest has been in the Bashir case because of the resistance of State 
Parties to comply with his arrest warrant due to immunity rules under 
customary international law. These decisions will be discussed below under 
chapter five. 
 
The same issue was raised in the case Prosecutor v. Gadhafi. The UNSC, 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, had referred the situation in 
Libya to the ICC pursuant to Resolution 1970.266 On 27 June 2011, the PTC 
authorised a warrant for the arrest of Muammar Gaddafi, the then serving 
President of Libya, which is not a party to the Rome Statute. By issuing the 
arrest warrant, the PTC determined that art. 27(2) would be applicable to 
Gaddafi and effectively remove his right to invoke personal immunity, 
notwithstanding Libya’s status as a non-party to the Rome Statute.267 In the 
decision, the PTC did not elaborate its reasoning on the issue of personal 
immunity, it merely made a reference to the decision in the Bashir case. In 
addition, the PTC did not issue any non-cooperation decisions against State 
Parties before Gaddafi’s death in 2011. However, the case illustrates how the 
ICC looks upon its power to remove the personal immunity of Heads of State 
of non-party when authorised with jurisdiction by the UNSC. 
4.7 The Assembly of State Parties 
The ASP is the ICC’s political organ composed of representatives of each 
State Party.268 When it became clear the ICC was to be an international 
organisation independent from the UN, establishment of a political body to 
provide advice and policy directions became essential.269 
 
The ASP plays a significant role in the operations of the Court. It has 
essentially administrative functions as well as a legislative role. The APS 
exercise an important influence upon the law applicable before the Court. It is 
also the forum for amendments to the Rome Statute.270 
 
Art. 112(2)(f) states: The Assembly shall […] Consider pursuant to article 
87, paragraphs 5 and 7, any question relating to non-cooperation271 
 
According to art. 112(2)(f) the ASP shall deal with matters of non-
cooperation. The article referrers to Art. 87(5) and (7), in which the issue of 
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non-cooperation is addressed. Particularly two issues were under discussion 
during the drafting of the Rome Statute: whether the ASP 1) had any role 
concerning non-cooperation by states not party to the Statute, 2) could 
engage in issues sua motu, or only upon referral from the relevant UN body. 
Some suggestions included that the ASP would act upon the recommendation 
of the Court, but was not incorporated in the provision. In the final text, the 
provision was extremely simplified.272 
 
As previously stated, art. 87(5) specifically concerns requests for cooperation 
to non-party states. Accordingly, action by the ASP appears to be conditional 
on the existence of an ad hoc agreement or arrangement with the Court273, 
and a referral by the Court to the UNSC, in the case of a UNSC referral. 
Cooperation by State Parties requires no special agreement, it is inherent in a 
state’s the ratification of the Rome Statute.274 
 
In 2012, recognising that the negative impact that non-execution of Court 
requests can have on the ability of the Court to accomplish its mandate, the 
ASP adopted procedures relating to non-cooperation275. The ASP stressed 
that the procedures aimed to improve implementation of the Court’s decision, 
and that ‘[a]ll actors involved must ensure that their participation in these 
procedures does not lead to discussion on the merits of the Court request or 
otherwise undermines the findings of the Court’.276 The procedures can only 
be triggered by a decision of the Court, which is addressed to the ASP.277 The 
procedure consists of several stages, beginning with an emergency meeting, a 
communication to all State Parties, and eventually a discussion within the 
plenary of the ASP. A ‘good offices’ role of the President of the ASP is also 
envisaged.278  
 
The procedures also address the respective roles of the Court and the ASP. 
Any response by the ASP would be non-judicial in nature and would have to 
be based on the competencies under art. 112 of the Rome Statute. The ASP 
may support the effectiveness of the Rome Statute by deploying political and 
diplomatic efforts to promote cooperation and to respond to non-cooperation. 
However, these efforts may not replace judicial determinations to be taken by 
the Court in on-going proceedings.279 
 
In addition to the Rules of Procedures, the ASP developed a Toolkit280 as a 
resource for States Parties to improve the implementation of the informal 
measures of procedures on non-cooperation, and encouraging states to meet 
their obligations to cooperate with the ICC in relation to arrest and surrender 
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of persons subject to an arrest warrant.281 The Toolkit mainly includes 
recommendations concerning monitoring of travels of persons subject to 
warrants of arrest and sharing information with the Court and States Parties 
as well as preventing instances of non-cooperation.282 
 
Art. 112 as well as the Rules of Procedures and the Toolkit leave the scope of 
authority of the ASP, when an issue of non-cooperation is properly before it, 
uncertain. Art. 119(1) states that disputes concerning ‘judicial functions’, 
should be resolved by the Court. However, Art. 119(2) of the Rome Statute 
resembles classic dispute resolution clauses in international treaties. The 
article provides for a mechanism for resolving disputes between State Parties 
that begins with bilateral negotiation and then proceeds to the ASP.283 The 
ASP may attempt to promote its own settlement, or it may refer the involved 
State Parties elsewhere, including, when possible, the ICJ.284 An issue on 
non-cooperation would seem to be appropriately examined from the 
perspective of art. 119(2), as a dispute between two or more State Parties. 
However, the scope application depends upon the interpretation given to 
“judicial functions” expressed in art. 119(1). The term appears elsewhere in 
the Rome Statute, where it seems to have the meaning of proceedings or 
trials. However, reducing the scope of art. 119(1) to debates about procedural 
matters seems too narrow. Rather, the purpose of the provision is to ensure 
that there is no second-guessing of rulings of the Court concerning the Rome 
Statute by other bodies. 285 Non-cooperation should be such judicial function 
according to this interpretation. 
4.8 Analysis 
The long and complex way to the establishment of the ICC testifies to 
aforementioned general sensitive issues evolving from the establishment of 
an international criminal court. Preparation of establishing the ICC included 
many stages and many conflicting opinions by States upon the provisions of 
the Rome Statute. However, in the end, the Statute had wide support, making 
it a treaty of universal scope, even though States as the U.S., China and 
Russia have not ratified the Statute.  
 
Although the ICC is an independent body, it has a close relationship to the 
UN. Jurisdiction of the Court may be triggered by the UNSC, even with 
regards to States not party to the Rome Statute. However, the legal effect of 
such referral including a non-party state is discussed, questioning if such 
referral triggers the Rome Statute applicable as a whole to that situation, 
including obligations of State Parties to arrest and surrender a Head of State 
of a non-party.  
 
It can be concluded that the Rome Statute can set aside Head of State 
immunity established in customary international law, which normally applies 
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between states. By ratifying the Rome Statute, a state agrees to the removal 
of personal immunity of its Heads of States before the ICC pursuant to art. 
27(2).  
 
Part IX of the Rome Statute sets out treaty provisions, which confer given 
powers of the ICC and set forth the corresponding obligations of State 
Parties, including obligation to arrest and surrender persons sought by the 
Court. However, drawing upon the textual interpretation of these provisions 
and discussions during the drafting of the Statute, one can conclude State 
Parties tried to avoid the obligations of contracting States to cooperate with 
the Court from becoming incompatible with international obligations binding 
a State Party vis-à-vis a state not party to the ICC. Art. 98(1) of the Rome 
Statute should be an example of this. It provides for a conflict solution, 
giving customary law precedence with regards to non-party states. 
 
The tension between art. 27(2) and 98(1) with regards to execution of arrest 
warrants by national authorities should be solved by the principle and 
complementarity and the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation. 
Both principles provide an interpretation of art. 27(2) that indicates the 
cooperation regime should be applicable both horizontal and vertical. 
 
As such, if a Head of State of a State Party commits a crime under the 
jurisdiction of the Court, art. 27(2) will not prevent the ICC from seeking the 
arrest of that person. The same applies to non-party states, which have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. This is confirmed in the case 
Prosecutor v. Gbagbo. 
 
However, where situations have been referred to the jurisdiction of the Court 
by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the legal principle 
is less clear. By the virtue of issuance of arrest warrants against Bashir and 
Gadhafi, the ICC stated its power to remove personal immunity of Head of 
States of a non-party pursuant to a UNSC referral. As such, the ICC does not 
consider art. 98(1) applicable in those situations, also with respect to arrest 
warrants. The PTC confirms this view in its decisions on non-cooperation in 
the Bashir case, which will be discussed in detail below under Chapter five. 
 
In addition to the important role of the UNSC in matters of non-cooperation, 
the ASP, as the political organ of the ICC, plays a significant role. Lack of 
cooperation can be a result of political differences (which will be discussed in 
detail below under chapter five with regards to the Bashir case). Moreover, 
the ASP has the power to take both administrative and judicial measures with 
regards to State Parties lack of cooperation. However, the ASP shall not 
question the merits of a Court request or otherwise undermine the findings of 
the Court. Therefore, its actions may be somewhat limited, but it has the 
power to make amendments to the Rome Statute.  
 
The legal effect of a UNSC referral and the relationship between art. 27(2) 
and 98(1) and its scope of application, as well as the role of the ASP, UNSC 
and other actors in non-cooperation matters will be further discussed in 
chapter five of this thesis with regards to the Bashir case.  
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5 The Bashir Case 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter five will review and discuss State Party obligations under the Rome 
Statute with regards to the Bashir case and the situation in Darfur, as referred 
to the ICC by the UNSC. Specifically, this entails discussing the legal 
rationale about State Party obligation to arrest and surrender Bashir to the 
ICC in the PTC decisions on non-cooperation against Malawi, DRC, South 
Africa and Jordan. Of particular interest is the interpretation of Resolution 
1593 as well as art. 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute. In addition, the 
aftermath of the decisions will be discussed, including scholarly critique and 
reactions by individual State Parties, in order to determine if the PTC resolve 
the legal issues convincingly. 
 
The chapter will also include a discussion on the role of the UNSC in the 
referral of the Darfur situation, triggering the Court’s jurisdiction, but also 
with regards to the PTC referral to the UNSC of non-cooperation decisions. 
In this regard, measures taken by the ASP will also be discussed. The role of 
both UNSC and ASP is specifically addressed for the discussion about giving 
effect of the legal solution, as well as the broader political perspective of the 
thesis. The analysis section will specifically focus on where the PTC has 
meet critique on its legal rationale. 
 
In order to give a background, the chapter will initially introduce a time line 
of events in the conflict in Darfur. This section also has the purpose to 
explain the gravity of the alleged crimes in the conflict, providing for an 
explanation of ICC’s reaction to the refusal of State Parties to cooperate the 
arrest warrants.  
5.2 The conflict in Darfur  
Following the separation of Sudan and South Sudan in July 2011, Sudan 
became the third largest state in Africa. Darfur is a region in Western Sudan 
with a population estimated to seven million people. Bashir has been the 
president of Sudan since 16 October 1993. Since 2003, there has been an on-
going non-international armed conflict286 between the Government of Sudan 
and at least two rebel groups, namely the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), in Darfur.287  
 
The causes of the conflict are complex. In the 1970s, the Government 
appointed new officials with both executive and judicial powers at state level. 
Leaders were appointed at the local level based upon loyalty to the central 
Government, without regard to the traditional leadership recognised by local 
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communities. The people of Darfur were generally excluded from social 
services normally provided by the state, such as education and medical 
care.288  
 
Increased desertification and drought during the 1980s resulted in significant 
movements of people. ‘Newcomers’ arrived to Darfur from Chad, Libya, and 
Mauritania. Darfur’s own issues of scarce water and other resources, resulted 
in these groups to have contentious relationship. Villages formed defence 
groups. Small arms and light weapons were imported into the region.289 As 
fighting intensified between 1995-1998, the Government began recruiting of 
militias, further aggravating divisions.290 
 
Against this backdrop, the two aforementioned rebel groups organised, 
drawing their members primarily from village defence groups. Most rebels 
were from the ethnic groups Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa. Already in 2002, the 
SLM/A and JEM took up arms against central authorities. However, the scale 
of rebel attacks increased noticeably in February 2003.291 Bashir and other 
high-ranking Sudanese political and military leaders allegedly agreed upon a 
common plan to carry out a counter-insurgency campaign against the 
SLM/A, JEM and other armed groups opposing the Government of Sudan in 
Darfur. The Government significantly increased its recruitment of proxy 
militias from Arab tribes also known as ‘Janjaweed’.292 Janjaweed attacks, 
and other attacks by Sudanese Government forces, including air force, 
continued to primarily be directed against the civilian population of Darfur, 
especially against tribal groups from which most of the rebels belonged to.293 
 
The UN estimates that over 300.000 people have been killed by violence or 
conflict-induced disease, starvation, or dehydration.294 The exact number of 
women and girls who been raped or subjected to sexual violence by Sudanese 
military personnel is unknown, but estimates suggest it is high. Survivors of 
rape and sexual violence have little or no access to health services. 
Thousands of villages and countless livelihoods have been destroyed.295 
According to UN estimates, 4,4 million people in Darfur are in need of 
humanitarian assistance.296 About 2,9 million people are displaced by the 
conflict, facing enduring hardships inside Darfur or in refugee camps in 
eastern Chad. Approximately 600.000 people were displaced during 2014 and 
beginning of 2015.297  
 
The UN and the AU have responded to the conflict with various interventions 
designed to resolve the conflict or to diminish the suffering experienced by 
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the civilian population of Darfur. In 2006, and in 2011, the Sudanese 
Government and rebel groups signed peace agreements, respectively 
endorsed by the UN and the AU. Neither of the agreements has improved the 
situation in Darfur.298 
 
The International Commission on Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) was established 
by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pursuant UNSC Resolution 
1564.299 In January 2005, the Commission reported to the UN that there was 
reason to believe that crimes against humanity and war crimes had been 
committed in Darfur and recommended that the situation be referred to the 
ICC.300 On March 31, 2005, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, adopted by a vote of eleven in favour with four abstentions301, 
Resolution 1593, whereby it referred the situation in Darfur, since July 1, 
2002 to the Prosecutor of the ICC.302 
 
In 2007, the UNSC authorised the hybrid AU-UN Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID), mandated to protect the civilian populations under imminent 
threat of physical violence and to prevent attacks on civilians. However, since 
2014 the Government subsequently renewed calls for UNAMID and 
humanitarian organisations to withdraw. Since 2007, 216 UNAMID 
peacekeepers and other staff have been killed during the mission.303 
 
Violence and grave violations of human rights continues in Darfur. The 
alleged perpetrators of these crimes are at large and cannot be brought to 
justice until they are arrested and surrendered to the ICC. Apart from Bashir, 
the Court has issued arrest warrants for four other defendants, including 
leaders of the Militia/Janjaweed and other Ministers of the Sudanese 
Government.304 One case has been dismissed due to lack of evidence and 
proceedings against one defendant were terminated following his passing.305 
5.3 Resolution 1593 
Art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute enables the UNSC to extend the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over a state not party to the Rome Statute. Resolution 1593 
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specifically declares, as art. 13(b) requires, that the UNSC was acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter issuing the resolution.306  
 
The UNSC, in Resolution 1593, established that ‘the Government of Sudan 
and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and 
provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor’.307 It did 
not explicitly make the Rome Statute binding upon Sudan and it recognises 
that states not party to the Rome Statute have no obligations under it, but 
urges all states to cooperate fully.308 
 
The UNSC also encourages the ICC to support international cooperation with 
domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat 
impunity in Darfur. 309 
 
The situation in Darfur is the first UNSC referral to the ICC.310 Therefore, it 
is unknown precisely how the provisions of the Rome Statute apply to a 
situation in a non-party state pursuant to a UNSC resolution, other than with 
regards to triggering jurisdiction.311 Moreover, the Rome Statute does not 
include any additional specific provisions explaining the legal consequences 
for the practice by the ICC. Resolution 1593 does not address immunity of 
State Officials. As stated in the introduction of this thesis, it is therefore 
uncertain how treaty rules contained in the Rome Statute, international 
customary law and obligations arising from the UN Charter, particularly the 
UNSC Chapter VII powers, interact with personal Head of State immunity 
provided under customary international law and how it effects the obligations 
for State Parties provided for in the Rome Statute. The conflict of sources of 
law must be sought for with the interpretation of Resolution 1593. 
 
Gaeta and Akande offer well-reasoned, yet unique, interpretations of the legal 
effect of Resolution 1593. Gatea is offering the most limited interpretation as 
she argues that a referral by the UNSC can only require member states of the 
UN to cooperate with the ICC if this intention is clearly expressed. With this 
strict legal approach, she argues a UNSC referral only triggers the ICC’s 
jurisdiction and the Rome Statute in its entirety only apply to State Parties to 
the Statute. Although Gaeta is clear that justice must be served for the 
horrendous crimes committed in Darfur, she argues justice must be achieved 
within distinct rules that regulate interactions between sources of 
international law. She argues if the UNSC does not issue expressly binding 
orders on states, the boundaries of treaty law, particularly pacta tertiis 
principle, must be respected.312 
 
Akande interpret art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute and UNSC referrals to the 
ICC to endow all provisions of the Rome Statute to the situation with the 
force of UN law. This approach is based upon the hierarchy of obligations 
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within the UN, particularly the UNSC overriding powers for dealing with 
threats to international peace and security. Akande argues that the UN 
Charter has a ‘constitutional’ nature and that treaties generally prevail over 
customary international law. This hierarchy of norms give Resolution 1593 
the legal effect of making the Rome Statute applicable in its entirety to the 
situation in Darfur. As such, Akande argues the fact that Sudan is bound by 
art. 25 of the UN Charter and implicitly by Resolution 1593 to accept the 
decisions of the ICC puts Sudan in an analogous position to a party to the 
Statute. The only difference is that Sudan's obligations to accept the 
provisions of the Statute are derived not from the Statute directly, but from a 
UNSC resolution and the UN Charter.313 
5.4 Non-cooperation of the request to 
arrest Bashir 
5.4.1 Investigation, arrest warrants and request 
for cooperation 
Following the referral from the UNSC, the prosecutor received the 
conclusion of the ICID. In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor requested 
information from a variety of sources, leading to the collection of thousands 
of documents. The prosecutor concluded that the statutory requirements for 
initiating an investigation were satisfied and decided to open the investigation 
on June 6, 2005.314 
 
After submission by the Prosecutor, the PTC issued an arrest warrant against 
Bashir on March 4, 2009, including charges of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.315 It concluded that Bashir as de jure and de facto President of 
Sudan and commander in chief of the Sudanese armed forces played an 
essential role in coordinating and implementing the campaign against the 
civilian population of Darfur. In July 2009, the Prosecutor appealed the 
decision to the extent that the PTC decided not to issue a warrant of arrest in 
respect of the charge of genocide. The PTC concluded, on February 3, 2010, 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe Bashir responsible for three 
counts of genocide against the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa tribes, and 
therefore issued the second arrest warrant.316 
 
The warrants of arrests list ten counts of crimes on the basis of Bashir’s 
individual responsibility under art. 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as a 
(co)perpetrator including five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts 
of war crimes, and three counts of genocide committed in Darfur during 
March 2003 until, at least, July 14, 2008.317 
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Following the issuance of the two arrests warrants, the ICC, pursuant to Part 
IX of the Rome Statute, transmitted to the State Parties to requests for the 
arrest of Bashir and his surrender to the court.318 Despite the issuance of the 
warrants and request for cooperation by the State Parties, Bashir is still at 
large and the arrest warrants are still to be executed.  
 
Early positive attitudes and constructive support of the ICC by African States 
changed following the indictment of Bashir. Mainly, the confrontation 
revolves around the ICC’s perceived prioritisation of Africa over other 
regions in its selection of cases and the potential effect of prosecutions on 
peace processes. Many African leaders are questioning the functioning of the 
Court as it heavily focused on Africa.319 
 
Some Arab and African leaders, Russia, and China also expressed their 
opposition to the arrest warrants.320 Several regional organisations, including 
the AU, have criticised the ICC and called on the UNSC for deferral of 
prosecution.321 In 2009, the AU construed the arrest warrants as serious 
threats to the on-going peace efforts in Sudan, and directed all African ICC 
member States to withhold cooperation from the Court in respect of the arrest 
and surrender of Bashir.322 On the other hand, supporters of the ICC argue 
that the ICC will contribute to Africa’s long-term peace and stability.323 
 
The current chief prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, has contended that 
seeking justice for victims on the African continent is hardly evidence of 
discrimination.324 According to Bensouda, the Court has not targeted African 
nationals, rather simply sought justice for victims of grave international 
crimes, including victims in Africa. She specifically stated: ‘all of the victims 
in our cases in Africa are African victims, and they are the ones who are 
suffering these crimes’.325 
 
Until Bashir is arrested and transferred to the seat of the ICC in The Hague, 
the case will remain in the Pre-Trial stage since ICC does not try individuals 
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unless they are present in the courtroom.326 Since the issuance of arrest 
warrants, eight decisions on non-cooperation has been issued stating State 
Parties failed to cooperate with the Court. In 2011, the PTC issued a decision 
against Malawi and a decision against DRC in 2014. During 2017, two 
decisions were issued, one against South Africa and one against Jordan. All 
the aforementioned decisions, except the decision against South Africa, were 
referred to the ASP and the UNSC for a formal finding on non-cooperation.  
5.4.2 The PTC analysis and conclusions 
All the aforementioned State Parties have been subjected to decisions on non-
cooperation due to the fact Bashir visited their territory and no attempt to 
arrest him was made by authorities. Malawi, DRC, South Africa and Jordan 
all requested the PTC to find that they did not act inconsistently with its 
obligations under the Rome Statute. They requested this outcome claiming 
the relationship between Sudan and State Parties is governed by customary 
international law. They argued Bashir enjoys immunity as a sitting Head of 
State under the rules of customary international law and that immunity has 
not been waived by Sudan or the UNSC in its Resolution 1593.327 
 
The PTC found that, pursuant to art. 87(7), all the subjected State Parties had 
failed to comply with the request to arrest and surrender Bashir and thereby 
preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under the 
Rome Statute.328  
 
In its decision against Malawi, the PTC admitted that there is an ‘inherent 
tension between art.s 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute and the role of 
immunity plays when the Court seeks cooperation regarding the arrest of a 
Head of State’. It went on to discuss the historic treatment of Head of State 
immunity by international law, arguing that there had been a gradual 
evolution towards its rejection before international courts.329  
 
The Chamber explained that art. 98(1) was not applicable because ‘customary 
international law creates an exception to Head of State immunity when 
international courts seek a Head of State’s arrest for the commission of 
international crimes’.330  
 
In its decision against DRC, the PTC’s position changed regarding the 
interpretation of art. 27(2) and 98(1), leaving aside the argument of an 
exception under customary international law removing personal Head of 
State immunity before international criminal courts. Instead, it concluded that 
Bashir enjoys immunity under customary international law, but the UNSC 
implicitly waived this immunity in Resolution 1593.331 
                                                
326 See Rome Statute art. 63.  
327 Decision against Malawi (n. 7) para 8; Decision against DRC (n. 7) para 18-19; Decision 
against South Africa (n. 7) para 32; Decision against Jordan (n. 7) para 14-15. 
328 Decision against Malawi (n. 7) para 47; Decision against DRC (n. 7) para 34; Decision 
against South Africa (n. 7) para 139; Decision against Jordan (n. 7) para 50. 
329 Decision against Malawi (n. 7) para 41. 
330 Decision against Malawi (n. 7) para 25. 
331 Decision against DRC (n. 7) para 29. 
 63 
 
In its decision against South Africa, the PTC revised its position again, 
leaving aside the conclusion of a waiver. It noted that customary international 
law prevents the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by states against Head of 
States of non-party states. The Chamber further noted that this immunity 
extends to any act of authority which would hinder the Head of State in the 
performance of his or her duties and the PTC is unable to identify a rule in 
customary international law that would exclude immunity for Head of States 
when their arrest is sought for international crimes by another state, even 
when the arrest is sought on behalf of the ICC.332 This position followed in 
the decision against Jordan.333 
 
However, the PTC emphasised that the issue before the Chamber ‘[d]oes not 
revolve around the effect of any possible immunity of Head of States on the 
exercise per se by the Court of its jurisdiction’.334 It further stressed no 
dispute has arisen with respect to the general validity of the proceedings 
against Bashir before ICC or of the arrest warrants issued. Instead, the matter 
concerned whether there existed a duty in the part of the State Party to 
execute the request for arrest of Bashir.335 The PTC concluded it is a question 
relating to the law applicable between states, i.e. between 
Malawi/DRC/South Africa/Jordan and Sudan.336 Therefore, the Chamber 
concluded it must determine whether and, if so, under what circumstances, 
there exists any derogation to the general regime of immunities under 
international law when the ICC seeks to arrest and surrender a person 
protected by immunity as Head of State. The Chamber stressed this 
determination primarily concerns interpretation of art. 27(2) of the Rome 
Statute and its relationship with art. 98(1).337  
 
South Africa argued art. 27(2) does not have any effect on the rights and 
obligations of states vis-á-vis the Court, but concerns only the Court’s 
jurisdiction, ensuring that such jurisdiction is not excluded in cases of 
immunity or special procedural rules attached to the official capacity of a 
person.338 The Chamber did not consent to this view and found that art. 27(2) 
of the Rome Statute also excludes the immunity of Heads of State from 
arrest. In its decision against Jordan, the PTC referred to its decision against 
South Africa regarding the interpretation of art. 27(2).339  
 
The PTC considered that since immunity from arrest would bar the ICC from 
the exercise of its jurisdiction, the general exclusionary clause of art. 27(2) in 
its plain meaning also encompasses that immunity. The Chamber stressed 
that if the drafters of the Statute intended exclusion only of a narrow category 
of immunities, they would have expressively done so in plain language.340 
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Moreover, the PTC stressed that such reliance on immunities or special 
procedural rules to deny cooperation with the court by State Parties to the 
Rome Statute would create an insuperable obstacle to the Court’s ability to 
exercise its jurisdiction. Such a result would according to PTC clearly be 
incompatible with the object and purpose of art. 27(2).341 Furthermore, the 
Chamber emphasised that the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction which fully 
depends on State Parties’ execution of the arrest warrants would be reduced 
to a purely theoretical concept if State Parties could refuse cooperation by 
invoking immunities based on official capacity.342 
 
According to the PTC, art. 27(2) prevents State Parties from raising any 
immunity belonging to it under international law as a reason for refusing 
arrest and surrender of a person sought by the court and from invoking any 
immunity belonging to them when cooperation in the arrest of a person is 
provided by another State Party.343 As there is no immunity from arrest and 
surrender based on official capacity with respect to proceedings before the 
Court where immunity would otherwise belong to a State Party, art. 98(1) of 
the Rome Statute is without object in the scope of application of art. 27(2). 
Therefore, no waiver is required as there is no immunity to be waived.344 
 
With these considerations, the Chamber stressed that the effect of art. 27(2) 
concerns both vertically, the relationship between a State Party and the Court 
and, horizontally, the inter-state relationship between State Parties to the 
Rome Statute.345 However, the Chamber emphasised this only applies to 
States that have consented to such a regime. States not party to the Statute in 
principle have no obligation to cooperate with the Court and the irrelevance 
of immunities based on official capacity as stated in art. 27(2) has no effect 
on their rights under international law. Conversely, with respect to States not 
parties to the Statute, the applicable regime is that of art. 98(1). Therefore, the 
court may not, in principle, without first obtaining a waiver of immunity, 
request State Parties to arrest and surrender the Head of State of a non-party 
to the Rome Statute.346  
 
As such, the Chamber stressed the fundamental distinction when considering 
issues of cooperation with the Court is thus between State Parties and states 
not parties to the Statute. Nevertheless, the PTC underlined that the Statue 
provides for a particular situation where obligations defined in the Statute 
may become incumbent upon a state not as a result of its acceptance of the 
Statute, but as a result of, and under, the UN Charter, as sui generis, i.e. in the 
Bashir case by Resolution 1593.347 
 
Concerning interpretation of Resolution 1593, South Africa and Jordan 
argued that while they would accept the UNSC to exercise its Chapter VII 
powers to suspend the customary obligations of states to respect the 
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immunity of a foreign Head of State, UNSC has not done so in the case of 
Bashir.348 Jordan argued that if the UNSC intended to impose an obligation 
on states, including State Parties to the Rome Statute, to lift the immunity of 
Sudan’s officials, including the absolute immunity of an incumbent Head of 
State, then the UNSC could have expressly stated so in Resolution 1593, or 
in subsequent resolutions.349 In addition, Jordan asserted that the object and 
purpose of Resolution 1593 are not defeated by interpreting it as silent with 
respect to the denial of immunity of Bashir from national criminal 
jurisdiction.350 
 
The PTC did not consent to the interpretation argued by South Africa and 
Jordan. It stated that in its resolution, the UNSC decided that Sudan should 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and 
the Prosecutor. Since immunities attached to Bashir are a procedural bar from 
prosecution before the ICC, the cooperation envisaged in Resolution 1593 
was meant to eliminate any impediment to the proceedings before the Court, 
including lifting immunities.351 In its decision against South Africa and 
Jordan, the Chamber concluded that the effect of a UNSC resolution 
triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction under art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute is that 
‘the legal framework of the statute applies, in its entirety, with respect to the 
situation referred’.352 As such the PTC revised its conclusion in the decision 
against DRC, that the Resolution included a waiver. 
 
Consequently, the PTC declined the argument of South Africa and Jordan 
that the legal relationship between Sudan and a State Party is governed by 
customary international law and not by the Rome Statute. The PTC 
empathised that in relation to the imposition on Sudan by the UNSC to 
cooperate fully with the Court and provide any necessary assistance, the 
terms of such cooperation are set by the Rome Statute, not by international 
customary law.353 It acknowledged that this is an expansion of the 
applicability of an international treaty to a state, which has not voluntarily 
accepted it as such.354 Nonetheless, the UNSC is permitted to impose 
obligations on states according to the UN Charter. Accordingly, the Statute 
regulates the interactions between Sudan and the ICC and art. 27(2) applies 
equally to Sudan, rendering any immunity on the basis of official capacity 
belonging to Sudan that would otherwise exist under international law.355  
 
Consequently, the PTC considered the immunities of Bashir, as Head of 
State, do not apply vis-à-vis State Parties when they execute a request for 
arrest and surrender issued by the ICC in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the 
situation in Darfur.356 Accordingly, art. 98(1) of the Rome Statute is not 
applicable to the arrest of Bashir. No immunity needs to be waived and State 
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Parties can execute the request to arrest and surrender without violating 
Sudan’s rights under customary international law.357 
 
For clarification, the PTC stated that for its conclusion it is unessential 
whether the UNSC intended, or even anticipated, that by virtue of art. 27(2) 
of the Rome Statute Bashir’s immunity as Head of State would not operate to 
prevent his arrest sought by the court in relation to the proceedings in the 
situation in Darfur referred by the UNSC.358 The PTC stressed ‘[…]this is a 
necessary, un-severable, effect of the informed choice by the Security Council 
to trigger the jurisdiction of this Court and impose Sudan the obligation to 
cooperate with it’.359 
 
Moreover, the PTC emphasised that art. 98(1) provides no rights for a State 
Party to refuse compliance with the ICC’s requests for cooperation. The 
article is addressed to the Court, and is not a source of substantive rights to 
the State Parties. While the provision does not indicate that a tension may 
exist between the duty of a State Party to cooperate with the ICC and that 
state’s obligation to respect immunities under international law, it leaves to 
the Court to address such matter.360 Consequently, the PTC considered that 
the State Parties were not entitled to rely on its own understanding of art. 
98(1) of the Rome Statute (whether on its own or in relationship with art. 27) 
to decide not to cooperate with the request to arrest Bashir.361 
 
All the reviewed cases above, except the decision against South Africa, were 
referred to the ASP and the UNSC respectively pursuant to art. 87(7) of the 
Rome Statute and Resolution 1593.362 
5.5 Aftermath of the PTC decisions 
5.5.1 Jordan’s appeal 
In March 2018, Jordan appealed the PTC decision to the Appeals Chamber of 
ICC.363 Jordan requested leave to appeal the decision with respect to four 
issues, two of interest for the scope of this thesis. Firstly, it argued the PTC 
erred with respect to a matter of law in its conclusion regarding the effects of 
the Rome Statute upon the immunity of Bashir, including conclusions that 
art. 27(2) excludes the application of art. 98 and that art. 98 establishes no 
rights for State Parties.364 
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Secondly, Jordan argued the PTC erred with respect to matters of law in 
concluding that Resolution 1593 affected Jordan’s obligations under 
customary international law accorded immunity to Bashir.365 
Concluding that the issues raised by Jordan arise out of the decision and that 
these issues ‘would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the 
proceedings or the outcome of the trial’ and that ‘an immediate resolution by 
the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the proceedings’, as necessary 
pursuant to art. 82 of the Rome Statute, the Appeals Chamber granted the 
appeal.366 In addition, the Appeals Chamber has invited observations from 
international organisations, State Parties and Professors of international law 
on legal matters raised by Jordan.367 
This will be the first time the Appeals Chamber will examine the legal issues 
of State Parties’ obligations to arrest and surrender a Head of State of a non-
party state subjected to the ICC’s jurisdiction pursuant to a UNSC referral.  
5.5.2 Scholarly critique 
The PTC decisions have meet critique. After the issuance of the decision 
against Malawi, Akande first criticised the PTC for issuing decisions on non-
cooperation very late after the issuance of arrest warrants. He also argues that 
the PTC ignored these sensitive issues has contributed to the tension with 
African states and to the feeling that the position of those states is just being 
ignored.368  
 
Akande continued to criticise the PTC’s rationale on a developed rule under 
customary international law removing immunities. He argued neither the 
practice of the international tribunals and courts, nor national state practice 
consent to this view.369 Even if the PTC were right that there is no immunity 
from prosecution before international courts, it fails to explain how this 
means that as a matter of customary international law national authorities are 
entitled to arrest in support of request from an international court.370  
 
According to Akande, the biggest weakness in the PTC decisions is that it 
fails to explain why art. 98 is there at all. If under international law, there can 
be no immunities when an international court seeks someone for prosecution, 
why did the parties to the Rome Statute insert art. 98? In short, national 
authorities may never raise the immunity of a Head of State as an obstacle to 
cooperation with the ICC. Akande argued art. 98 has been made redundant by 
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the PTC decision and that this is contrary to a basic principle of treaty 
interpretation.371  
 
However, instead, Akande has argued there was another route that could have 
been taken by the PTC. It could simply have said that the effect of the referral 
of the situation by the UNSC has the consequence that Sudan is bound by the 
Statute. The effect of this would therefore mean that those states are to be 
regarded as in the same position as a State Party to the Rome Statute. As 
explained above, this legal rationale is were the PTC ended up in its decisions 
later issued. 
 
Gatea agreed with Akande’s critique regarding the PTC’s interpretation of a 
new rule under customary international law removing immunities.372 
However, Gaeta was not convinced by the legal rationale in the PTC’s 
following decisions in which it changed its legal rationale, making the Rome 
Statute applicable in its entirety. Instead, she argues that art. 98(1) is still 
applicable to the case and that the ICC must obtain a waiver by Sudan in 
order to require State Parties to comply with its request to arrest. Such waiver 
is according to Gaeta not included in Resolution 1593.373 
 
With regards to later decisions, Abel Knottnerus has criticised the decision 
against South Africa. He questions if the ICC is allowed to treat Sudan as a 
State Party as both the Rome Statute and Resolution 1593 indicate that Sudan 
remains a non-party. He criticised the PTC for not addressing this matter and 
argued its assumption that Sudan should be treated as a State Party turns a 
blind eye to the numerous provisions in the Statute that explicitly distinguish 
the legal position of a State Party to that of a non-party. Knottnerus argued 
there is no textual argument in the Statute for treating Sudan as a State Party 
and that a referral does not transform a non-party into a Sate Party, it only 
triggers the Court’s jurisdiction. As such, Knotterus argued the Rome Statute 
may be applicable in its entirety, but Sudan should still be treated as a non-
party. Consequently, provisions addressing the relationship to non-parties are 
applicable, including art. 98(1).374 
 
Different possibilities giving legal effect to a solution have also been 
discussed. For instance, Akande has argued ICJ be asked to render an 
advisory opinion on the immunity of Heads of States not party to the ICC. He 
argues this because the PTC has changed it legal rationale over time. 
Although Akande argues it is possible for the ICC Appeals Chamber to sort 
this issue out but since there is such distrust between the AU and the ICC it 
seems unlikely that African states will accept any ICC decision on the matter. 
In addition, Akande argues the ICJ would potentially address the whole range 
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of international law arguments made by the AU rather than just the position 
under the ICC Statute.375 
5.5.3 Reactions by indivudal State Parties  
Before the PTC issuance of the decision against South Africa, South Africa’s 
obligation to cooperate with the ICC was tried in the High Court of South 
Africa. The Government argued that it had higher obligation not to arrest 
Bashir than cooperating with the ICC request. In September 2015, the High 
Court of South Africa denied the Governments argument, concluding the 
implementation of the Rome Statute in South African domestic law clearly 
constituted a higher obligation.376 The Government appealed the judgment, 
but the South African Supreme Court of Appeal’s dismissed the appeal. The 
Appeal Court found that by passing the implementation of the Rome Statute 
Act in 2002, South Africa had effectively annulled all forms of immunity, 
including Head of State immunity, and that it was bound by its obligations 
under the Rome Statute and therefore had to arrest Bashir.377 
In 2016, after stating it would withdraw from the Rome Statute, the 
Government withdrew its application on the matter to the South African 
Constitutional Court. However, in early 2017, South Africa revoked its 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute after a decision by the Gauteng High 
Court ruled that the initial process to withdraw from the ICC was 
unconstitutional.378 However, after the PTC decision against it, South Africa 
again has again threatened to leave the ICC.379 
In addition to the judgments by domestic courts in South Africa, a Kenyan 
Court of Appeal, in early 2018, reaffirmed an earlier decision stating the 
Kenyan Government’s international obligation to arrest Bashir should he ever 
return to Kenya. Taking the historical foundations of international criminal 
law into account, the Court acknowledges that despite potential conflicts that 
there is no real legal conflict between provisions of the Rome Statute with 
respect to immunity.380 However, on the political level, Kenya during a 
meeting with the ASP, proposed an amendment to Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute, which would provide for immunity of Heads of States.381 
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At first glance, the ICC’s lack of legitimacy ranks as a prime justification for 
opposition to the ICC in parts of Africa.382 However, as mentioned above, 
African states were deeply involved in creating the ICC and all the provisions 
in the Rome Statute, including the lack of immunity for Head of States. 
Moreover, several African states have invited ICC action in their countries, 
thus refuting the argument of a blanket lack of legitimacy. Questioning the 
Court’s legitimacy has only become common since the ICC started charging 
sitting Heads of State. Hence, while the focus of the Court’s prosecution on 
Africa has certainly damaged the perception that it is truly impartial, arguing 
that the Court lacks legitimacy is often used as a strategic argument to depict 
the Court as anti-African.383 
 
International-level explanations shed light on African states non-cooperation. 
The AU has put non-cooperation pressure on its member states. This 
pressure, institutionalised through the AU Assembly’s 2009 decision calling 
on member states not to cooperate in the arrest of Bashir, subjected State 
Parties to the Rome Statute a loyalty conflict between its AU and ICC 
commitments.384 In existing scholarship, international pressure often leads to 
compliance with human rights treaties. However, the Bashir case shows that 
international pressure, here through the AU, may also lead to non-
cooperation with an international treaty as the AU’s policy directly 
counteracts the ICC’s arrest warrant.385 In a statement made by John Jeffery, 
Deputy Minister of Justice and constitutional development in South Africa, 
he stressed that had Bashir been arrested, there would have been ‘extreme 
consequences in the region’.386 This testifies to a deep concern about the 
repercussions for South Africa’s relations with the AU if it would execute the 
ICC arrest warrant. 
5.5.4 Measures taken by the ASP and the UNSC 
As explained above, Art. 87(7) provide for the possibility for the ICC to refer 
a decision of non-cooperation to the ASP and the UNSC. The ASP has taken 
measures with regards to the decisions on non-cooperation regarding the 
situation in Darfur and the arrest of Bashir. As stated above, because of the 
lack of cooperation it adopted official procedures regarding non-cooperation 
as well as a toolkit on non-cooperation.387  
 
In the toolkit, the ASP specifically addresses the arguments about the Rome 
Statute’s inapplicability to non-party States, which continues to be ventilated. 
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In order to avoid such future debates, the ASP suggest the UNSC use a 
clearer language in its future resolutions referring situations to the ICC. The 
ASP argues its suggested language more closely reflects the cooperation 
language found in Resolution 827 and 955, which respectively established 
the ICTY and the ICTR and as such clarifying the legal effect of such 
resolution making the Rome Statute applicable as a whole to the situation 
referred. The suggested language states an implicit reference that the state of 
the situation referred should cooperate fully pursuant to both the resolution 
and the Rome Statute.388 
 
The President of the ASP has recalled multiple times the importance for 
states to spare no effort in executing the arrest warrants issued by the ICC 
and forwarded to State Parties the decisions of the PTC related to non-
cooperation.389 
 
The UNSC, however, has not taken any actions to ensure that State Parties 
are held accountable for their failure to arrest and surrender suspects sought 
by the ICC. The PTC referred to this problem in its latest decisions on non-
cooperation regarding the situation in Darfur. In its decisions, the PTC stated 
that the UNSC refers a situation to the ICC, it is expected that the UNSC 
would respond by way of taking such measures which are considered 
appropriate, if there would be an apparent failure on the part of a State Party 
to the Statute to cooperate in fulfilling the Court’s mandate entrusted to it by 
the Council. The PTC stressed that if there is no follow up action, any referral 
by the UNSC to the ICC would never achieve its ultimate goal to end 
impunity. Such referral would become futile.390 
 
Since 2015, the Prosecutor has respectively addressed the issues of non-
cooperation and lack of actions by the UNSC in its biannual reports to the 
Council pursuant to Resolution 1593.391 Recalling the non-cooperation 
findings referred to the UNSC, the Prosecutor stated that the Council’s 
inaction invariably undermined the credibility of it and that of the referral 
mechanism, and in addition had a great adverse impact on victims.392 The 
Prosecutor stated it was past due for the UNSC to address instances of non-
cooperation and urged it to fully assume its responsibilities by taking strong 
and concrete measures to ensure compliance with the Rome Statute and 
Resolution 1593.393 Moreover, the Prosecutor expressed that unless the 
Council acts decisively and forcefully there was little prospect for the arrest 
of Bashir, meaning that justice would continue to elude the victims of 
Darfur.394 
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Considering many of the UNSC permanent members are not part of the 
Rome Statute, there may exist a risk of a deferral if the UNSC takes action. 
AU representatives in the UNSC constantly remind it of their opposition to 
the arrest and surrender of Bashir and reiterate their call for the use of a 
deferral.395 In response to Bensouda’s statement before the UNSC in 2016, 
the Russian representative stated:  
 
[…] the obligation to cooperate, as set forth in resolution 1593 (2005), 
does not mean that the norms of international law governing the 
immunity of the Government officials of those States not party the Rome 
Statute can be repealed, and presuming the contrary is unacceptable.396  
 
However, member states of the UNSC have also shown support to the ICC. 
During the briefing by Bensouda in December 2017, representatives for 
France, Sweden, Italy, Ukraine, Uruguay and Japan all stressed the 
importance of cooperation with the court to arrest and surrender Bashir, as 
well as stressing the importance of UNSC to act upon the referrals of non-
cooperation.397  
5.6 Analysis 
The Darfur conflict has a long and complex history, which has resulted in 
grave international human rights violations by the Sudanese Government 
with Bashir as its leader. The gravity of the crimes committed against the 
civil population of Darfur as well as UNAMID personnel, and the conflict’s 
sequel of humanitarian crisis as well as the Government’s resistance to 
improve the situation in combination with the ICC’s mandate to end 
impunity, are all factors explaining why the ICC consider it urgent to 
prosecute the alleged perpetrators. In addition, the Prosecutor has been 
provided with a great amount of evidence, which probably leave the 
Prosecutor to believe a conviction is fairly possible. 
 
The situation in Darfur is the first situation being referred to the ICC by the 
UNSC. As shown in this thesis, customary international law governing Head 
of State immunity as well as the practice of other international courts and 
tribunals leaves the scope of personal Head of State immunity before 
international courts uncertain. Therefore, it is not very surprising issues arise 
when personal Head of State immunity is a question before the first 
permanent international criminal court for the first time. The future practice 
of the ICC, its relationship to the UN, and the state of Head of State 
immunity under customary international law, is dependent on the outcome in 
the Darfur situation before the ICC. 
 
The author of this thesis believes the PTC in its two latest decisions offers a 
well-reasoned legal rationale considering State Parties obligation to arrest a 
Head of State of a non-party to the Rome Statute when subjected to the 
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Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to a UNSC resolution. However, the PTC has 
meet opponents and critique, questioning the credibility of the legal rationale.  
 
Akande criticise the PTC for its delay in addressing the matter, which is fair 
critique, but without meaning for the legal rationale. He also argues the PTC 
failed to address that the issues contribute to the tension with African states 
and that the position of those states is being ignored.398 The author of this 
thesis believes this critique does not address the legal rationale of the issues, 
rather the political aspect. Even though the PTC could have addressed the 
political considerations arising, its mandate is to concentrate on the legal 
questioned addressed before it. 
 
Both Gaeta and Akande questioned the legal rationale in the PTC’s earlier 
decision in which it concluded a new rule under customary international law 
removing immunity before international courts.399 Akande argues neither the 
practice of the international tribunals and courts, nor national state practice 
consent to this view.400 The author of this thesis agrees, and so does the PTC 
in its later decisions. Akande argued that instead the PTC could have 
concluded the legal effect of a UNSC resolution is that the Rome Statute in 
its entirety is applicable to that situation, which the PTC does in its latest 
decisions.401 
 
According to the author of this thesis, there is not sufficient evidence 
showing such exception has developed. The pure formation of a customary 
rule that binds all states is complex and state practice is not in conformity 
with such conclusion. Neither State Parties nor the PTC argues for such 
conclusion. State Parties argues customary law prevails over the Rome 
Statute, and the PTC concludes that as a result of that the Rome Statute is 
applicable in its entirety, customary law on immunities does not apply. As 
such, the solution of the legal problem is determining which legal regime 
applies in what situations, which the PTC has concluded is the Rome Statute. 
 
However, the PTC’s change of position, not once but twice. This testifies to 
the complex legal question at hand. It may be argued this degrade the PTC’s 
credibility. The author of this thesis does consent to this view. However, in 
its two latest decisions, the PTC offers well-reasoned legal rationales.  
 
Jordan decided to appeal the decision against it, arguing the PTC erred in two 
matters of interest within the scope if this thesis. Firstly, it argued PTC’s 
interpretation that art. 27(2) exclude the application or art. 98 was not correct. 
Similarly, Akande argues that the PTC failed to explain why art. 98 is 
included in the Rome Statute at all. He questioned whether State Parties ever 
may raise personal immunity as an obstacle for compliance. 402 He has a valid 
argument in this matter, though it was argued for the decision against 
Malawi, in which the PTC had a different legal rationale from its later 
decisions. However, in its later decisions the PTC also failed to explain in 
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what situations art. 98(1) can be applicable. If the Rome Statute is applicable 
in its entirety in situations referred by the UNSC, the Rome Statute is 
applicable in its entirety in all triggering-mechanisms available in the Rome 
Statute. However, the ICC can prosecute nationals of a non-party state 
pursuant to territorial jurisdiction. Thus, if a national of a non-party commits 
a crime in the territory of a State Party, this person can be subject for 
prosecution before the ICC. In such situation art. 27(2) would not apply to 
that national, thus, customary international law on immunities will be 
applicable and art. 98(1) will serve its purpose. As such, even though the 
PTC did not address this, art. 98(1) is not redundant. 
 
Secondly, Jordan argued that the PTC erred in concluding Resolution 1593 
affected Jordan’s obligations under customary international law. In other 
words, Jordan questioned the whole legal rationale by the PTC with regards 
to its interpretation of the legal effect of Resolution 1593.  
 
Scholars have argued that the plain language of Resolution 1593 is not clear 
enough to conclude its legal effect.403 The author of this thesis agrees. Gatea 
is offering a very limited interpretation as she argues that a referral by the 
UNSC can only require member states of the UN to cooperate with the ICC if 
this intention is clearly expressed, thus, a strict textual interpretation.404 In 
this author’s opinion, Gaeta’s approach undermines the notion that any 
respectable system of international criminal justice must be effective. The 
establishment of the ICC was aimed to fill gaps in criminal accountability 
before domestic courts. The very definition of crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction illustrate that perpetrators of these crimes often are senior State 
Officials abusing their power in order to commit international crimes. 
According to Gaeta’s interpretation, such senior officials will enjoy immunity 
for such crimes. Given the conflicting objectives of customary international 
law on personal immunities and international criminal law, the interactions of 
these sources of law should be interpreted bearing these objectives in mind. 
As such, the purpose of art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute must be considered to 
interpret the appropriate legal effect of a UNSC resolution referring a 
situation to the ICC. 
 
Although not addressed by the PTC, but above by this author; during the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute, a small group of states opposed including a 
provision allowing the UNSC to refer situations to the ICC. The states 
rationale was that they feared that a referral from the politically oriented 
UNSC would undermine the legitimacy and independence of the ICC. 
However, the majority of states agreed that such provision was necessary for 
ending impunity. In addition, the ability of the UNSC to influence the 
mandate and procedures of the ICC is limited to art. 13(b).  
 
As such, Gaeta’s interpretation of the UNSC referral as a mere triggering 
mechanism is not the most appropriate. Such interpretation prevents the 
purpose of art. 13(b). It seems incongruous that the drafters of the Rome 
                                                
403 Akande ‘Legal Nature of UNSC Referrals’ (n. 25) 340; de Hoogh, Knottnerus (n. 373); 
Knottnerus (n. 374). 
404 Gaeta ‘Immunity from Arrest’ (n. 22) 330. 
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Statute would enable the UNSC to refer situations to the ICC, extending the 
ICC’s jurisdiction over non-parties, yet preventing the Court from exercise 
this jurisdiction not making the Rome Statute applicable to the situation, 
which was also addressed in other words by the PTC. 
 
However, Bashir is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. It may be 
argued at this stage of the case, it is not a matter of justice, but a matter of 
legality and procedural law. Therefore, the issues of immunity would be more 
appropriate to address regarding Bashir’s arrest to execute his punishment. 
However, considering art. 27(2) prohibits states to imply immunity as a 
procedural bar, it must also apply when the ICC seeks arrest for trial, 
specifically considering trials in absentia are prohibited pursuant to the Rome 
Statute.  
 
Akande’s interpretation seeks to ensure that all states are able to assist the 
ICC in arresting Bashir, enabling justice to be served through international 
criminal proceedings. In addition, this interpretation shows a strong desire to 
follow the purpose of art. 13(b) and the UN Charter in general. Akande’s 
interpretation is in line with the PTC latest decisions against South Africa and 
Jordan. The legal rationale offers not just textual interpretation, but also 
teleological. Considering the purpose of individual provisions, the ICC as a 
whole as well as its relationship with the UN and the purpose of UNSC 
referrals, it concludes that the legal effect of such referral is that the Rome 
Statute is applicable in its entirety. 
 
Knottnerus criticised this conclusion as well, arguing Sudan should be treated 
as a non-party with regards to provision explicitly distinguish between State 
Parties and non-parties.  The author of this thesis agrees that the PTC should 
have addressed this issue. However, although Knottnerus is right there is no 
textual argument in the Statute for treating Sudan as a State Party, there is 
teleological interpretation giving that effect. Specifically, considering the 
principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation. Knottnerus interpretation 
has the same effect as Gaeta’s interpretation. The ICC cannot effectively 
fulfill its mandate given to it pursuant to Resolution 1593, if Sudan would not 
be treated analogously as a State Party. The provisions of the Rome Statute, 
Resolution 1593 and the UN Charter must be interpreted to give meaning to 
all of them harmoniously. As there is more than one legal regime applicable, 
a strict textual interpretation and applying strictly pacta tertiis, is not in line 
with principles of interpretation provided for under international law. 
 
The PTC has gained wide support. Most importantly, domestic Courts in both 
South Africa and Kenya have concluded that they as State Parties to the 
Rome Statute are obligated to cooperate with the court, even if such 
cooperation would conflict with immunity rules under customary 
international law. Although the ICC should have the last word in the matter, 
the support of domestic courts, specifically in African states is significant.  
 
On the political level this support is lacking, specifically by African states 
and member states of the UNSC, which are not parties to the Rome Statute. 
However, although states to some extent argue on a legal level against the 
PTC decision, political statements by for example representatives of South 
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Africa, testifies to that its non-cooperation with ICC is of political nature, 
protecting its relationship with the AU. The fact the both South Africa’s and 
Kenya’s domestic legal system confirm its obligations under the Rome 
Statute, but the Government does not, testifies to this conclusion. In addition, 
none of the African states subjected to non-cooperation decisions has 
appealed that decision, but political statements critiquing the PTC proceed. 
This protection of the relationship between individual African states and the 
AU has escalated to threats of withdrawal from the Rome Statute. Lack of 
legitimacy of the ICC is proven not to be the justification for opposition by 
African states since these states been deeply involved in creating the ICC and 
all the provisions in the Rome Statute. Also after its entry into force, African 
states have cooperated with the Court’s mandate. 
 
Moreover, there are logical reasons why ICC focuses on African states. As 
the principle of complementarity explains, the ICC was created to fill a gap in 
national jurisdiction. Many African states are unwilling or unable to 
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. The ICC was created for 
exactly these cases as its whole raison d’etre is to end impunity and deliver 
justice to the victims of international crimes, no matter the political power of 
perpetrators. As Bensouda stated, the victims are also in African states. 
Regards must be given to the ones justice will be delivered to.  
 
Akande’s suggestion to ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion may be effective. 
Moving the matter to the ICJ would possibly allow for the obligations under 
separate sources of law to be considered separately and then allow the ICJ to 
consider what the overall position is under general international law. This 
possibility is however not explicitly addressed in the Rome Statute. On the 
contrary, art. 119(1) of the Rome Statute states that any dispute concerning 
judicial functions should be settled by the Court. As stated above, the purpose 
of the provision is to ensure that there is no second-guessing of rulings of the 
Court concerning the Rome Statute by other bodies. Asking the ICJ for an 
advisory opinion would not be in line with that purpose. This is a matter for 
the ICC, and a decision from the Appeals Chamber is expected. In addition, 
Akande gave political reasons for this suggestion. Political reasons should 
not afford for second opinions by other bodies, even though Akande’s 
argument that it might be effective is legitimate.  
 
Under the Rome Statute, it is unclear what measures to be expected by the 
ASP and the UNSC when a referral of a decision of non-cooperation is 
referred to it. However, the referral mechanism of non-cooperation decisions 
must exist for a reason, although not stated in any negotiations while drafting 
the Rome Statute, certain measures can be expected. The ASP cannot 
question the Court’s decisions or judgment on its merits. Consequently, it has 
acted consistently with the decisions on non-cooperation, calling upon State 
Parties to cooperate and established procedures and a toolkit for non-
cooperation as a result of the referrals. The ASP does however also holds the 
power to amend the Rome Statute, providing it an opportunity to clarify 
relevant provisions. Seven-eights of the State Parties to the Rome Statute 
must ratify such amendment pursuant to art. 121(4) of the Statute. 
Considering the political aspect, such result is unrealistic. 
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The UNSC has done nothing as a whole to improve the matter. Statements by 
individual member states of the UNSC prove the intense political aspect as 
such statements considering the dissenting opinions. With non-parties to the 
Rome Statute, e.g. the U.S., China and Russia, as permanent members of the 
UNSC, as well as African states’ critique against the Court in the Council, 
the matter includes difficult political considerations. 
 
The UNSC is the sole actor in the situation, which has not expressed its 
considerations on the issue. The UNSC inaction is making the whole referral 
mechanism, as well as the effectiveness of the ICC, doubtful. However, as 
the UNSC is politically oriented, it can be questioned if it is the right actor to 
decide on the effect of such complex legal problem. Instead, this author 
leaves it hope to the ICC’s Appeals Chamber’s future decision on the non-
cooperation by Jordan. As a Chamber of higher authority, and with a 
different composition than the PTC, it can give a solution to the legal issues 
considered credible in the international society, for State Parties and in 
particular, for African states. 
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6 Final analysis, reflections for 
the future and conclusions 
6.1 Introduction   
Drawing upon the analysis of each previous chapter of this thesis, chapter six 
will answer the primary research question, by analysing the obligations of 
State Parties to the Rome Statute to uphold the immunity Heads of States 
enjoy under customary international law when faced with a request to arrest a 
Head of State of a non-party to the Statute, in a situation referred to the ICC 
by the UNSC.  
 
The chapter be divided in sections focusing on each secondary research 
question which then be individually discussed in relation to the primary 
research question. Each section will include argument for de lege lata, and 
the sixth section will focus on reflections for the future, specifically on how 
to give effect to the solution to the legal questions. Lastly, the conclusions of 
the thesis will be presented. 
6.2 Personal Head of State immunity under 
customary international law 
The rules of customary international law on personal immunity, comprising 
immunity from the exercise of jurisdiction and arrest, have developed to 
ensure reciprocal respect among states for their sovereignty and to protect 
officials representing foreign states from possible abuses by other states of its 
powers and authority. The absolute immunity of an incumbent Head of State 
was illustrated in the Arrest Warrant case, which have been the prevailing 
case law providing legal rationale for personal Head of State immunity before 
domestic courts. In its decision the ICJ concluded immunities could be 
violated by a state regardless of the presence of the foreign Head of State 
concerned on the territory of that state, i.e. as in the case of the issuance of an 
arrest warrant. This is because a coercive act like an arrest warrant put the 
inviolability of those Head of States at risk, hampering their freedom to travel 
abroad to discharge their official functions. Consequently, incumbent Heads 
of States cannot be prosecuted before foreign national jurisdiction, nor be 
subject for an arrest warrant issued by such jurisdiction. Old traditions 
deriving from State immunity is applied although somewhat modified with 
regards to the legal rationale being functional necessity. However, personal 
immunity still applies to both official and private acts, including international 
crimes. 
 
The legal rationale for Head of State immunity under customary international 
law is under constant scrutiny, specifically concerning developments under 
international criminal law including the principles of individual criminal 
responsibility and irrelevance of official capacity, as well as the normative 
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hierarchy theory. The latter have less support in the international society, 
even though Judges of international courts has argued for this rationale in 
dissenting or separate opinions. The principles of individual criminal 
responsibility and irrelevance of capacity is well established and part of 
customary international law. This confirms to the strong will of the 
international society to end impunity for grave international crimes. 
However, the latter principle as confirmed under customary international law 
is applied with respect to functional immunity, not personal, as it is affirmed 
to be absolute under the same regime. 
 
The illustrated de lege lata legal rationale, i.e. absolute personal immunity, is 
argued by the State Parties to the Rome Statute as a hindrance to execute the 
arrest warrant of Bashir. It is argued, customary international law governs the 
relationship between State Parties to the Rome Statute and non-parties to the 
Rome Statute. Pursuant to this argument, State Parties have an obligation to 
respect the personal immunity of Bashir stated under customary international 
law.  
 
At first, in its decision on non-cooperation against Malawi, the PTC 
answered to this argument concluding an exception under customary 
international law had developed, removing personal immunity before 
international courts. However, in later decisions, it declined such exception 
concluding personal immunity is absolute under customary international law, 
also before international criminal courts. PTC’s latest decisions declare that 
personal immunity under customary international law, even though it is under 
intense scrutiny, is absolute for the time being, but there are still ways to 
prosecute incumbent Heads of States before international courts.  
6.3 Personal Head of State immunity 
before international courts and 
tribunals 
6.3.1 The relevance of the Arrest Warrant Case 
In the Arrest Warrant case the ICJ found that the mere issuance of the arrest 
warrant by the Belgian judicial authorities against the incumbent Minister of 
Foreign affairs of DRC breached customary international law on personal 
immunities. These rules were violated by Belgium by simply circulating 
internationally the arrest warrant, regardless of whether Belgium had taken 
necessary steps to request other states to execute it. Accordingly, the ICJ 
stated that personal immunity is absolute before domestic courts.  
 
In this regard, the relevance for personal immunity before international courts 
was stated in the obiter dictum of the judgment in which the ICJ stated that 
Heads of States may be prosecuted for international crimes before 
international criminal courts. Specifically, it referred to the ICTY, ICTR and 
ICC. As such, the ICJ opened up for a legal rationale including an exception 
under customary international law to remove immunity of incumbent Heads 
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of States before international criminal courts. However, this implied 
exception has rather been an incitement for international criminal courts to 
find other legal rationales for personal Head of State immunity to be 
inapplicable before its jurisdiction. This may be a result of that the ICJ did 
not address the matter in detail, leaving important questions without answers, 
including what constitute an international criminal court or tribunal. In 
addition, there is not sufficient state practice creating opinio juris for such 
exception under customary international law. 
 
Crucially, the Arrest warrant case has played an important role in the 
development of personal immunities before international criminal courts and 
tribunals as it opened up for international courts to apply legal rationales to 
prosecute incumbent Heads of States and impose obligations on states to 
arrest such individuals. However, the international criminal courts have 
applied different regimes of international law than an exception under 
customary international law.  
6.3.2 The legal effect of requests for 
cooperation by International tribunals and 
courts 
International criminal tribunals and courts are not judicial organs of a 
particular state. They act on behalf of the international society as a whole to 
protect collective or even universal values. As such, their jurisdiction or 
judicial activity is not an expression of the sovereign authority of a state over 
another. Thus, proceedings before international courts cannot be considered 
as a form of unduly interference with the sovereign prerogatives of another 
state, which is the rules of personal immunity aims to avoid. 
 
This argument is supported by the Taylor case before the SCSL, in which the 
court relied upon its ‘international nature’ to reject the claim of defence that 
the issuance of the arrest warrant against the then incumbent Head of State of 
Liberia violated the rules on personal immunity under customary 
international law. The fact that no one questioned if the ICTY violated the 
personal immunity of the then incumbent President of FRY in the Milosevic 
case, in which the court issued and circulated an arrest warrant against him, 
also testifies to this conclusion.  
 
However, the international criminal courts where established upon different 
grounds, affording different legal regimes applicable, binding upon UN 
member states or contracting parties to a Statute. The ICTY and the ICTR 
were created by virtue of a decision of the UNSC and were vested with the 
authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The SCSL is a treaty-based 
court, as well is the ICC. The latter courts rests upon the direct consent of 
contracting states. This distinction imply a few differences in the courts’ 
authority to require states to comply with judicial requests such as arresting a 
person entitled to personal immunity under customary international law. 
However, the tribunals and courts have respectively indicted and sought the 
arrest of incumbent Heads of States.  
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Regarding the ICC, similarities to the ICTY and ICTR as well as SCSL can 
be argued. The ICC is a treaty-based body and as such dependent on State 
Parties consent by their ratification of the Rome Statute, similar to the SCSL. 
When the jurisdiction is triggered under art. 13(a) or (c) of the Rome Statute 
the situation should be the same as before the SCSL: treaty provisions 
removing personal immunity can solely be applied to State Parties to the 
Rome Statute. However, the ICC has a close connection to the UN and art. 
13(b) provides the UN to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to refer a 
situation to the ICC.  
 
One can argue this conclusion entails that the ICC, with an analogue 
interpretation, should have the same authority as the ICTY and the ICTR. As 
illustrated above, the ICTY and the ICTR, respectively in Resolutions 827 
and 955, was given the authority of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter in its 
judicial activities. As the UNSC distinctly is acting under Chapter VII when 
imposing obligations on Sudan in Resolution 1593, the ICC may also been 
given this power.  
 
However, the nature of the relationship between ICC and the UN is not as 
close as between the UN and the ad hoc tribunals. The UN Charter is not 
applicable as such before the ICC, and the ICC does not have the authority to 
issue judicial orders binding upon all UN member states as the ICTY and 
ICTR, entailing that the Rome Statute cannot prevail over customary 
international law pursuant to art. 103 of the UN Charter. Instead, the UN has 
applied its power to make the Rome Statute in its entirety applicable to the 
situation in Darfur. The Rome Statute is binding upon Sudan, but not other 
UN member states not parties to the Rome Statute. 
6.4 Personal Head of State immunity 
before the ICC 
6.4.1 The legal effect of a UNSC resolution 
referring a situation to the ICC 
The PTC, in its decisions on non-cooperation, concluded, in general terms, 
that the legal effect of a UNSC resolution referring a situation to the ICC is 
that the Rome Statute in its entirety is applicable to the situation referred. As 
such, the PTC concluded a UNSC referral is an expansion on the applicability 
of an international treaty and that the UN, under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter is permitted to impose obligations on its member states, in this 
situation, Sudan. 
 
Even though the PTC in its first two decisions argued for a new rule under 
customary international law removing personal immunity before international 
courts and that this rationale meet intense critique, the author does not see it 
necessary to continue this discussion. In its six latest decisions the PTC 
argues on the contrary for a different legal rationale (although not consistent 
to one), which imply personal immunity absolute under customary 
international law. As there is not enough sufficient state practice constituting 
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opinio juris for such rule, this argument can be left aside for the discussion 
on interpretation of the legal effect of Resolution 1593. 
 
The plain language of Resolution 1593 is not clear enough to interpret its 
legal effect. However, PTC’s legal rationale is credible, considering 
principles of interpretation under international law. The ICC and the 
Prosecutor are acting under the Rome Statute. By deciding Sudan should 
cooperate fully and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor, requires Sudan to also be bound by the Rome Statute as the Court 
and the Prosecutor are acting there under. Though the ICC is treaty-based, 
and solely can impose obligations on its State Parties, its close relationship 
with the UN, and the allowance under the Rome Statute for the UNSC to 
refer situations to the Court acting under Chapter VII, supports this 
conclusion. In addition, the UN, thus, the international society as a whole, has 
endorsed the referral mechanism trough the Negotiated Relationship 
Agreement. 
 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that authority of the UNSC to 
influence the ICC is through art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute in combination 
with the UN Charter Chapter VII, separating the legal regimes. The ICC is in 
all other ways independent from the UNSC. On the contrary, the ICTY and 
ICTR were established by the UNSC and their pure existing was dependent 
on the UNSC. The Rome Statute is applicable to the situation referred by the 
UNSC, and the UN Charter is applied in its referral, not in the situation when 
it is before the Court. Thus, the ICC should not have the authority to make 
customary international law inapplicable before it pursuant to the UN 
Charter. However, for Sudan, Resolution 1593 is a biding decision pursuant 
art. 25 of the UN Charter, therefore, it is bound by the Rome Statute. With a 
teleological and analogue interpretation, Sudan is to be treated as a State 
Party. 
 
The PTC decisions have also meet critique regarding the interpretation of the 
legal effect of Resolution 1593. The alternative legal rationales offered by 
Geata and Knottnerus, discussed above, provide for very strict arguments. 
Gaeta does not consider teleological interpretation, stressing pacta treetis 
should be implicitly applied.405 Knottnerus argument is broader, but still 
prevent the ICC to effectively fulfil its mandate given by the UNSC. Akande 
argues for similar legal rationale as the PTC in its two latest decisions.406 
This rationale offers a textual and teleological interpretation considering the 
Rome Statute, the relationship between ICC and the UN and the UNSC’s 
authority to impose obligations on its member states, but still respect the 
decision by other member states of the UN to not become a party to the Rome 
Statute.  
 
Critique by State Parties, specifically African states, as well as non-party 
states, for example Russia, should be seen as mere political concerns without 
any legal relevance. The contradiction between legal decisions and political 
                                                
405 Gaeta ‘Immunity from Arrest’ (n. 22) 332. 
406 See Akande ‘Legal Nature of UNSC Referrals’ (n. 25); Akande, ‘ICC Issues Detailed’ (n. 
368). 
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statements at domestic level is also indicative of political motives for non-
cooperation. Even though political concerns are important for the 
effectiveness of the mechanism, they do not contribute in resolving legal 
discrepancies. In addition, one cannot avoid the fact the ICC and the judges 
of the PTC are given the authority to interpret the Rome Statute. ICC should 
be seen as an independent and credible international criminal court, 
delivering legal decisions and judgment, without any political considerations.  
6.4.2 The relationship between article 27(2) and 
98(1) of the Rome Statue and its scope of 
applicaiton 
As the legal effect of a UNSC resolution referring a situation to the ICC is 
that the Rome Statute in its entirety is applicable to the situation referred, the 
provisions of the Rome Statute govern obligations for State Parties to the 
Statute in that situation. The Rome Statute also governs the relationship 
between the Court and Sudan. Therefore, in order to determine the obligation 
for State Parties to arrest and surrender a Head of State of a non-party, 
subjected to the Courts jurisdiction through a UNSC referral, the scope of art. 
27(2) and 98(1) must be discussed. 
 
The Rome Statute is binding upon Sudan and therefore, art. 27(2) is 
applicable to the situation in Darfur, analogously as to a situation referred by 
a State Party. In its plain meaning, art. 27(2) encompasses personal 
immunity. This does not mean personal immunity does not exist under 
customary international law, rather that the regime is not applicable in that 
situation. Sudan has no right to impose personal immunity as a procedural 
bar since the UNSC imposed the obligations under the Rome Statute on 
Sudan. Just as for a contracting State Party, the Rome Statute prevail 
customary international law pursuant to art. 27(2), solving the conflict of 
applicable norms. 
 
South Africa, as well as Gaeta, argued there is a difference between 
immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from arrest.407 The former seems 
according to South Africa, to be the sole meaning of art. 27(2), hence, Head 
of States enjoy immunity from arrest of other states.408 The PTC concluded 
that immunity from arrest would bar the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction. 
The author of this thesis agrees with this conclusion. The textual meaning of 
the article does not provide for such distinction. Moreover, there was no such 
distinction during the drafting of the Rome Statute. The ICC does not have its 
own enforcement power and is dependent on State Parties to cooperate and 
execute arrest warrants. If such immunity would apply with regards to arrest 
warrants, the sole purpose of the ICC to end impunity and prosecute 
perpetrators of international crimes would be lost.  
 
As such, both the textual and the teleological interpretation of art. 27(2) 
provide that State Parties, and the relevant non-party in the situation referred 
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408 See Decision against South Africa (n. 7) para 38. 
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by the UNSC, are prevented from raising any immunity belonging to it under 
international law as a bar from arrest or a reason for not executing an arrest 
warrant.  
 
On the contrary, art. 98(2) provides for customary international law to prevail 
the Rome Statute. Personal Head of State immunity is solely governed by 
customary international law. As there is no immunity applicable under 
international customary law pursuant to art. 27(2), the request by the Court to 
arrest and surrender a Head of State subjected to prosecution through a 
UNSC referral, cannot be considered to require a State Party to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to 
immunities. The scope of art. 98(1) is without object in the scope of 
application of art. 27(2). Hence, art. 98(1) is only applicable when art. 27(2) 
is not. As been argued above, this apply both vertical and horizontal due to 
the effect of the principle of complementarity and the principle of 
effectiveness in treaty interpretation. 
 
Akande questioned if art. 98(1) is ever applicable.409 Even though it would 
have been evident for the PTC to address this question, it was not the legal 
question before it. However, the author of this thesis concludes that art. 98(1) 
would be applicable when the Court has jurisdiction over a national of a non-
party state who committed crimes in the territory of a State Party. 
6.5 Reflections for the future 
It has been argued that international tribunals and courts in their practice 
contribute to the development of customary international law, limiting the 
possibility of serving or former Heads of State to invoke personal immunity. 
The 123 State Parties to the Rome Statute have agreed upon the mandate of 
the ICC to end impunity, and the Rome Statute being applicable to the 
practice before it. Customary international law on personal immunities is not 
applicable other than to states not parties to the Statute and not subjected to 
the jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to an acceptance of the jurisdiction or a 
UNSC referral. Extensive state practice is necessary to constitute opinio juris. 
Therefore, the practice by the ICC cannot contribute to its development.  
 
The author of this thesis argues that personal Head of State immunity under 
customary international law will continue to be subjected to intense scrutiny, 
and perhaps there will be sufficient evidence of state practice for an 
exception under customary international law removing personal immunity 
before international courts in the future. However, the ICC has provided for a 
conclusion not affecting customary international law as such. Instead, it 
concluded that the Rome Statute is applicable in a situation referred to the 
Court by the UNSC. When the Rome Statute is applicable, customary 
international law on personal immunity pursuant to art. 27(2) of the Rome 
Statute is not applicable, leaving the latter legal regime unchanged in 
substance. Instead, the scope of the application of customary international 
law before the ICC is clarified.  
 
                                                
409 See Akande, ‘ICC Issues Detailed’ (n. 368). 
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As such, the rationale of personal Head of State immunity under customary 
international law renders unchanged, applicable absolute before both 
domestic and international courts. However, it is not applicable before an 
international criminal court established by a Statute where State Parties to the 
Statute has agreed upon this fact, or in the case of a UNSC referral, agreed 
upon the international community as a whole to make the Rome Statute the 
legal regime applicable to a situation referred. 
 
In this authors opinion, it is quite clear that non-cooperation by African states 
are not just a result of dissenting with the legal rationale – it has a clear 
political aspect. The fact that none of the African states subjected to decisions 
on non-cooperation has appealed those decisions also testifies to this 
conclusion. Even though the legal issues, raised by State Parties in the 
decisions on non-cooperation, are important to address to come to a 
conclusion, they are motivated by political pressure. Such political 
considerations should not affect the legal rationale as such. Nevertheless, as 
the fractious relationship between African states and the ICC indicates, as 
well as the political orientation of the UNSC, the very effect of credibility of 
the legal rationale given by the PTC is affected by political considerations. 
 
Important steps are taken by the ASP to improve the cooperation of State 
Parties, including a statement that State Parties should not question the merits 
of the Court’s decisions or otherwise undermine the findings of the Court. 
However, since Bashir is still at large, even after eight non-cooperation 
decisions issued by the PTC, these measures render ineffective.  
 
The ASP has the power to amend the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
Considering the submissions by the State Parties subjected to non-
cooperation decisions before the PTC and other State Parties opposing these 
arguments supporting the PTC, it is not realistic the ASP would agree upon 
an amendment. This is regardless if it would clarify the provisions of the 
Rome Statute in line with the legal rationale of the PTC, or on the contrary, 
that personal immunity under customary international law is applicable in 
situations referred by the UNSC, as Kenya suggested.  
 
Consequently, although not optimally, to make the legal rational credible, it 
is important for the UNSC to take measures endorsing it. As it has done 
nothing to call upon states to cooperate with the Court and accept the legal 
rationale by the PTC, no one can know what the effect of such measure 
would entail. Both the PTC and the Prosecutor have urged the UNSC to take 
responsibility. Therefore, it seems like they consider the Council’s action 
important. The inaction by the UNSC is making the referral mechanism 
doubtful. It does also prevent the ICC to effectively end impunity in the 
situation in Darfur, which the UNSC specifically encourages in Resolution 
1593. Bashir will continue governing Sudan, the situation in Darfur will not 
be improved and victims will continue suffering. 
 
In addition, even though the PTC expressed its legal rationale in general 
terms, the future language of a UNSC resolution referring a situation to the 
ICC is left to the UNSC. However, since the PTC used both textual and 
teleological interpretation, the UNSC would be required to state an opposing 
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legal rationale in plain language in such resolution to change that resolutions 
legal effect from Resolution 1593. 
 
There are also legal options of making the legal rationale credible. For 
instance, the ICC Appeals Chamber, through Jordan’s appeal will soon have 
the legal issues before it to determine. Although it is not certain the Appeals 
Chamber will come to the same conclusion through the same legal rationale 
as the PTC did in its latest decisions, the author of this thesis finds it is likely 
it will. The PTC offers a legal rationale considering aspects of the law not 
addressed by either individual State Parties, AU nor UNSC. The Appeals 
Chamber’s decision will be important for the credibility of the legal rationale, 
specifically since the PTC has been inconsistent in its decisions.  
 
Akande also argued for the option to ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion on 
the matter.410 As argued above, this author believes this would not be in line 
with the purpose of article 119(1) of the Rome Statute. Questions concerning 
the judicial functions of the ICC should be a matter for the ICC to decide. 
Even though this author believes a judgment by the ICJ would be effective 
with regards to African states, it would undermine the credibility of the ICC 
and its authority to interpret the Rome Statue. Instead, this author stresses the 
importance of the Appeals Chamber’s future judgment on the appeal by 
Jordan. Regardless if it will come to the same conclusion as the PTC, its 
judgment will have higher authority, which hopefully will provide effect to 
its legal rationale, also with regards to African states.  
6.6 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the solution to the legal questions of this thesis revolves 
around determining which international legal regime is applicable when a 
situation is referred by the UNSC to the ICC. As there is no hierarchy of 
sources of law in international law, textual and teleological interpretation, 
pursuant to the Vienna Convention, of customary international law, UN law 
and the Rome Statute have been of significant importance for the conclusion.  
 
There is not sufficient state practice constituting opinio juris for a new rule 
under customary international law which remove personal immunity before 
international courts. Instead, international criminal justice before the ICC is 
governed by a different international legal regime, including a mechanism to 
refer situations in non-party states to the jurisdiction of the Court, agreed 
upon by the international community as a whole through the Negotiated 
Relationship Agreement. 
 
According to the author of this thesis, the PTC provides a credible legal 
rationale of the legal question in its two latest decision, through both textual 
and teleological interpretation, including considerations of customary 
international law, UN law and the Rome Statute. With this legal rationale, the 
legal effect of a UNSC resolution referring a situation to the ICC is that the 
Rome Statute is applicable in its entirety to that situation, and is also binding 
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upon the relevant non-party. Thus, art. 27(2) is applicable (both with regards 
to jurisdiction and arrest warrants) when a Head of State is subjected to 
prosecution pursuant to such referral, prohibiting that state to invoke 
immunity as a procedural bar. Thus, leaving art. 98(1) inapplicable, as well as 
customary international law on personal immunities.  
 
Therefore, State Parties to the Rome Statute are not obligated to uphold the 
personal immunity Heads of States enjoy under customary international law 
when faced with a request for arrest and surrender of a Head of State of a 
non-party to the Statute subject to ICC’s jurisdiction pursuant to a UNSC 
referral of a situation authorised by art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute. State 
Parties are not required to disregard their obligations under customary 
international law to not violate a Head of State’s right to immunity, because 
there are no such immunity rules applicable. 
 
However, the PTC has been inconsistent in its decisions. In addition it did not 
address all legal questions of concern. Therefore, the legal rationale lacks 
credibility to some extent. This opens up for critique and leaves the legal 
rationale ineffective. Even though the author of this thesis may argue against 
this critique, higher authority, such as the Appeals Chamber of the ICC, must 
address these matters to provide credibility to the legal rationale. 
 
The very credibility of the legal rationale is to some extent dependent on 
political considerations. African states are not willing to accept the legal 
rationale, in this author’s conclusion, because of political concerns. UNSC is 
the sole actor, which has not taken any measures to either endorse or decline 
the legal rationale issued by the PTC. The PTC concluded the legal effect of a 
UNSC resolution in general terms. Consequently, its interpretation should be 
applicable in future situations referred to the Court by the UNSC. However, 
the interpretation is still dependent on the wording provided for by UNSC in 
its resolutions, leaving the future of this matter to the UNSC. The ASP has, 
however, tried to influence the UNSC through suggested language in future 
resolutions. Still, ending impunity of the crimes committed in Darfur, and in 
future situations possibly referred to the ICC by the UNSC, is dependent on 
the latter’s actions. 
 
The gravity of the crimes allegedly committed and the on-going conflict in 
Darfur as well as the Sudanese President’s refusal to cooperate with 
humanitarian help, implies the importance of the arrest and surrender of 
Bashir to the ICC. Leaving the legal issues to the politically oriented UNSC 
is neither desirable nor compatible with respect for the rule of law. Therefore, 
the future judgment by the Appeals Chamber on Jordan’s appeal, is crucial 
for the future practice by the ICC, particularly, with regards to personal Head 
of State immunity in situations referred by the UNSC. The author stresses the 
significance of this judgment in order to provide a credible legal rationale, 
after considering all aspects of the legal issues before the Chamber, avoiding 
influence of politics on the legal judgment. 
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